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Searching for the Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment 
Erratum 
THE BUFFALO LAW REVIEW wishes to correct a citation error appearing in our Volume 44-1. In his article, 
Searching for the Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 197 (1996), Kevin 
Szczepanski cited to an article authored by Dennis Henigan and Keith Ehrman entitled: The Second 
Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989). 
Although Mr. Szczepanski properly cited to Mr. Henigan and Mr. Ehrman's article on numerous oc- 
casions, he incorrectly cited to their article in support of the pro- position that the "central purpose" of the 
Second Amendment is to ensure that individuals citizens would be armed as a deter- rent against federal 
tyranny. Mr. Szczepanski quoted the article as follows "[T]he [Slecond [A]mendment is aimed at ensuring 
that all private citizens would be armed, and thus able to rise up in revolt against any goverment action 
perceived by the masses at 'tyrannical"' Id. at 216 n. 114. 
Unfortunately, this quotation has been taken out of context. The quoted language descibes not the 
viewpoint of Mr. Henigan and Mr. Ehrman, but rather that of "those who oppose govern- ment efforts to 
regulate firearms . . . ." 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. at 24. The next paragraph, and indeed Mr. Henigan and Mr. 
Ehrman's entire article, -is devoted to refuting the thesis ex- pressed in the quoted language. As the 
authors argue, the pur- pose of the Second Amendment is to protect the people's right to be armed in 
service to state-sponsored militias, not to resist the* "tyranny" of federal agencies. 
This comment is available in Buffalo Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol44/
iss1/7 
Searching for the Plain Meaning of the
Second Amendment
KEVIN D. SZCZEPANSKIt
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.'
INTRODUCTION
A. The Controversy
Not surprisingly, controversy has surrounded the Second
Amendment ever since the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights in
1791.2 Unlike cases involving the other amendments, which usually
focus on the outer margins of the rights they provide, the Second
Amendment debate has not resolved the Amendment's very pur-
pose.' Difficult questions remain regarding each phrase of the Sec-
ond Amendment: What is a "well regulated militia?" Why is one
"necessary to the security of a free state?" Who are "the people?"
What is the scope of their right to "keep and bear arms?" To what
extent shall that right "not be infringed?"
Traditionally, the answers to these questions have depended
upon which clause of the Second Amendment is emphasized. At
one extreme, "state's right" commentators emphasize the Militia
t J.D., University at Buffalo School of Law, May 1995.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II. Variations are common in the punctuation and capitalization
of the Second Amendment. David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiogra-
phy of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter Histography]. Another
version places commas after "militia," "state" and "arms." Id.; Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204,
206 (1983). Although the use of only one comma after the word "state" departs from the
traditional punctuation of the Amendment, it is used here to emphasize the two distinct
clauses and conditional structure of the Second Amendment. See infra notes 4 and 6.
2. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 108 (1987) (recognizing that the right guaranteed by the
Second Amendment is by no means "self-evident"); Histography, supra note 1, at 1; see
also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YAL. L.J. 637, 643-44
(1989) ("No one has ever described the Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the Second
Amendment is perhaps the worst drafted of all its provisions.").
3. See Historiography, supra note 1, at 1; Levinson, supra note 2, at 644; Lund, supra
note 2, at 108.
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Clause,4 arguing that the Second Amendment guarantees only a
state's right to maintain organized military units.5 At the other ex-
treme, "individual right" commentators emphasize the Right to
Arms Clause,6 arguing that the Second Amendment guarantees an
individual's right to possess ("keep") and carry ("bear") arms.
Each group declines to read substantive content into the particular
clause that the other emphasizes. Thus, individual right theorists
argue that the Militia Clause is little more than a precatory recog-
nition of the importance of a militia to the security of the Repub-
lic." State's right commentators argue that the Right to Arms
Clause ensured only the collective role of "the people" in preserv-
ing the security of the Republic.9
The bitter political debate over crime control complicates the
legal debate over the Second Amendment's plain meaning.10 The
upsurge in drive-by shootings, carjackings and tourist murders in
many of our nation's major cities weakens the political clout of the
individual right position by multiplying the incentives for federal
and state handgun regulation.1 But the "specter" of the Second
4. "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state ..... " U.S.
CONsT. amend. II.
5. Id.; see Kates, supra note 1, at 206, 216-18.
6. "[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
7. Historiography, supra note 1, at 1; Kates, supra note 1, at 206.
8. See, e.g., Historiography, supra note 1, at 59-61 (arguing that the militia clause was
intended only as a recognition of the importance of a militia to a free state, not as a restric-
tion on the individual right to arms).
As Don Kates explains, the individual right view is rejected by a majority of legal schol-
ars. Kates, supra note 1, at 206. Indeed, one eminent commentator on constitutional law is
so convinced that the Second Amendment guarantees no individual right that he relegates
his brief analysis of the Amendment to a single footnote within his discussion of the federal
legislative power. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2, at 299 n.6 (2d
ed. 1988).
However, the individual right view is accepted by a majority of nonlegal scholars and
the general public who, "though supporting the idea of controlling guns, increasingly oppose
their prohibition, believing that law-abiding citizens may properly have them for self-de-
fense." Kates, supra note 1, at 206.
9. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of
the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 23, 31 (1984). As Don Kates observes, the state's
right theory is accepted by the majority of legal scholars, as well as the American Civil
Liberties Union and the American Bar Association. Kates, supra note 1, at 207.
10. For one example of potent sarcasm, see Margaret P. Anderson, Knox and the NRA:
Some Quick Draws, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at A15 ("[T]hanks to Neal Knox and his
NRA .... I understand that what I should really worry about is the takeover of the U.S.
government by Nazis-and that the way to counter this possibility is to buy myself a gun.
Thanks . . . for setting me straight.").
11. Recently, Congress enacted the long-awaited "Brady Bill" into law. The Brady
Handgun Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-23 (1993), imposes a national five-day
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Amendment frequently is raised as a political and legal impedi-
ment to gun control legislation.
12
B. The Search for Plain Meaning
The controversy surrounding the Second Amendment chal-
lenges both legal and nonlegal scholars to neutrally derive, define
and apply the Second Amendment's plain meaning.13 The search
waiting period on the purchase of a handgun. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I). A sunshine
provision limits the Act to sixty months. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1). The Act also provides for an
elaborate "national instant criminal background check system," 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1), which
would reduce the waiting period to three days. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii).
12. Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth
Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DArTON L. REV. 5, 6 (1989); Kates,
supra note 1, at 204; Anderson, supra note 10, at A15; David S. Broder, NAFTA May Be a
Winner, But Crime is the Bigger Worry, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY., Nov. 22-28, 1993, at 13.
13. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 146-53 (1990). Judge Bork ex-
plains that the plain meaning of a constitutional provision is best understood in light of the
original understanding of the Framers of the Constitution. Neutral derivation of principle
ensures that judges may never create new constitutional rights, or destroy old ones, based
upon their inclinations toward a particular ideology or interest group. Id. at 146-47. Neutral
definition of principle means defining a principle thoughtfully but narrowly based upon the
"words, structure and history of the Constitution." Id. at 148, 150. Neutral application of
principle involves application that is consistent and without regard to a judge's sympathy or
lack of sympathy with the parties to a lawsuit. Id. at 151.
For further discussion of the importance of originalism in constitutional interpretation,
see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REv. 849 (1989)
[hereinafter Originalism]; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter Rule of Law].
For Supreme Court decisions espousing the original understanding in interpreting con-
stitutional provisions, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717
(1988); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Rich-
ardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945); Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Polluck v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 395 (1873); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 287 (1870); Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 657 (1838); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's
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for plain meaning requires analysis of the historical context and
language of the Second Amendment's twenty-seven words.14
This Comment develops the conditional, individual right to
keep and bear arms15 through analysis of the historical context and
language of the Second Amendment. Specifically, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms is a narrow individual right that is
expressly conditioned on the necessity of a well regulated militia to
the security of a free state. Part I discusses two traditional Second
Amendment interpretations, the state's right and individual right
theories. Part II supplies the historical context of the conditional,
individual right from English common law, through the adoption
of the Constitution, to the Second Amendment's ratification. This
part next explains the scope of the conditional, individual right
through analysis of the plain meaning of each phrase of the Second
Amendment. Where one keeps and bears arms specifically in order
to defend oneself against federal government attempts to establish
a tyranny, the Second Amendment protects one's conduct.
Part III examines Supreme Court and circuit court decisions
involving the Second Amendment. Although these decisions do not
thoroughly analyze the historical context and language of the Sec-
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
The challenge, as one commentator has suggested, is to devise an interpretation of the
Second Amendment that would be acceptable to the Supreme Court "in light of its modern
approach to civil liberties." Lund, supra note 2, at 130.
14. Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the importance of plain language constitutional
interpretation in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819):
It is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the con-
vention, when the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was
adopted. It is necessary to go further, and to say that, had this particular case
been suggested, the language would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it
would have been made a special exception.
Id. at 644.
Robert Dowlut also has recognized the importance of "interpretivism," or "deciding
constitutional issues [based only upon] ... norms that are stated clearly or implicitly in the
written Constitution." Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to
Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 59-60 (1989) (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST 1 (1980)) [hereinafter Guarantees to Arms].
15. David Hardy previously has suggested a "hybrid" interpretation of the Second
Amendment, in which the right to keep and bear arms is individual but its source is collec-
tive. Historiography, supra note 1, at 2 n.4; see David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUs. POL'Y
559, 615-22 (1986) [hereinafter Armed Citizens]. Thus, "individuals are seen as having a
right to possess arms suitable for organized military reserve duty." Historiography, supra
note 1, at 2 n.4. However, Mr. Hardy seems to have retreated from his hybrid interpretation




ond Amendment, they are consistent with this comment's condi-
tional, individual right theory. Finally, Part IV argues that if the
conditional, individual right theory were accepted, it would be nec-
essary to hinge greater protection of the individual right to keep
and bear arms on state constitutions and courts.
I. TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The State's Right Theory
State's right theorists' 6 emphasize the Militia Clause of the
Second Amendment: "A well regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free state .... "I These theorists view the Second
Amendment as a reaction to the Congressional power to provide
for calling forth the militia 8 and for organizing, arming and disci-
plining it.'9 A fear had arisen in the young Republic that Congress
might use its constitutional powers to disarm the states' organized
militias, leaving the states defenseless against federal tyranny.
20
The Second Amendment was adopted in order to "place the states'
organized military forces beyond the federal government's power
to disarm, guaranteeing that the states would always have suffi-
cient force at their command to nullify federal impositions on their
rights and to resist by arms if necessary." 2'
State's right theorists also view the Second Amendment as a
hedge against a large, potentially oppressive federal standing
army.22 Even though the federal government had the authority to
16. For commentary advocating the state's right theory of the Second Amendment, see
Cress, supra note 9; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12; Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting,
The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 46 (1966); Ralph J. Rohner,
The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U. L. REv. 53
(1966); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of
the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975); John C. Santee, Note, The
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 423 (1977).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
18. Id. art. I., § 8, cl. 15 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions[.J").
19. Id. cl. 16 ("Congress shall have Power... [to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia .... reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.").
20. Kates, supra note 1, at 212.
21. Id.
22. Id. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison addressed popular concerns about the
supposed dangers of large standing armies in peacetime in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-29 (Al-
exander Hamilton), No. 46 (James Madison).
The Federalist is the first and most authoritative commentary on the United States
1996]
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maintain small standing armies in times of need,23 the basic de-
fense of the republic would rest in the states' reserved military
power to maintain their own officially organized military units.
2 4
The Second Amendment "not only guaranteed the states' right to
keep armed forces, but obviated any need for a massive federal
military which might defeat them if they found it necessary to
revolt.
25
The language of the Second Amendment reveals two problems
with the state's right theory. First, the theory essentially ignores
the Right to Arms Clause, which expressly guarantees the right of
"the people," not the states, to keep and bear arms.26 Second, the
theory supposes too narrow a definition of the term "militia" in
the Militia Clause. In the eighteenth century, the term "militia"
rarely was used to refer to organized military units. The militia
included "the whole militarily qualified citizenry." 27  These
problems with the state's right theory have raised significant ques-
tions about its validity, and engendered the second of the two
traditional interpretations of the Second Amendment.
B. The Individual Right Theory
Unlike state's right theorists, individual right theorists28 em-
phasize the Right to Arms Clause of the Second Amendment: "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
'29
These theorists read the phrase "right of the people" as naturally
creating not a state right, but one that individual citizens may as-
Constitution. THE FEDERALIST vii (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The work originally was pub-
lished as a series of letters at fairly regular intervals from October 27, 1787 to August 16,
1788. Id. at viii.
23. Kates, supra note 1, at 212; see THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 157, 161 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
24. For example, in their respective National Guard units. Kates, supra note 1, at 212;
Lund, supra note 2, at 106.
25. Kates, supra note 1, at 212.
26. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II (emphasis added).
27. Lund, supra note 2, at 106 n.6 (suggesting that the "language of the Constitution
actually refutes [the state's right theory]"). For a discussion of the plain meaning of the
term "militia" in the Second Amendment, see infra part II.B.1.
28. For commentary advocating the individual right theory of the Second Amendment,
see David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM
URn. L.J. 31 (1976); Dowlut, supra note 14; Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the
Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 65 (1983); Richard E.
Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky. L.
REv. 63 (1982); Armed Citizens, supra note 15; Historiography, supra note 1; Kates, supra
note 1; Robert E. Shalhoupe, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM.
HIST. 599 (1982) [hereinafter Ideological Origins].
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
202 [Vol. 44
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sert. 0 A natural reading of the phrase is supported by the inter-
pretation of similar language in the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. 1
Some individual right theorists actually accept the state's
right theory, but argue that the Second Amendment had a dual
purpose: to protect not only the states' right to have organized mi-
litias, but also to an individual right to keep and bear arms.32 This
argument increases the rhetorical burden on opposing state's right
theorists: they must show that the Second Amendment was in-
tended to guarantee a state right, but was not intended to protect
an individual right.,3
At least one problem arises with the individual right theory.
Specifically, the exact scope of the individual right is not self-evi-
dent, and is not expressly defined in the Constitution. 4 Since
many individual right theorists argue that the federal and the state
governments may not infringe on the right to keep and bear arms,
the "logical conclusion" is that individuals may keep and bear gre-
nades, machine guns, missiles, tanks or whatever "arms" they de-
sire.35 Such a broad definition of "arms" conflicts sharply with the
contemporary desire to ban assault weapons and curtail handgun
sales.3"
Neither of the traditional interpretations account adequately
for both clauses of the Second Amendment. Analysis of the history
30. Kates, supra note 1, at 213.
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging... the right of
the people peaceably to assemble ..... ); U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects... shall not be violated .... "); U.S.
CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); U.S. CONST. amend. X
("The powers not delegated to the United States... are reserved to the States... or to the
people.").
The Bill of Rights relates foremost to private, individual rights. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 193-94 (R. Rutland and C. Hobson eds., 1977). Thus, "the people" as used in the
Bill of Rights refers not to states' rights, but to individual rights.
32. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 1, at 213; Ideological Origins, supra note 28, at 610.
33. See Kates, supra note 1, at 213. As Mr. Kates suggests, this rhetorical "double bur-
den" is itself made difficult by the plausible natural reading of the phrase "right of the
people." Id.
34. Lund, supra note 2, at 504.
35. Michael T. O'Donnell, Note, The Second Amendment: A Study of Recent Trends,
25 U. RICH. L. REv. 501, 503-04 (1991). For a discussion of the plain meaning to the term
"arms" in the second amendment, see infra part III.B.6.
36. See, e.g., Broder, supra note 12, at 13; William Schneider, Crime Pays For the Poli-
ticians; How the Politics of Fear Devoured the Incumbents, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at
C1 (arguing that public's desire for stronger gun control measures has increased marginally




and language of the Second Amendment should incorporate both
the Militia Clause and the Right to Arms Clause, which together
form the Amendment's conditional structure.
II. THE CONDITIONAL, INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a nar-
row individual right that is expressly conditioned on the necessity
of a well regulated militia to the security of a free state.37 Analysis
of the Second Amendment's historical context and language sup-
ports this conclusion.
A. The Historical Context of the Second Amendment
1. English Common Law. English common law placed signifi-
cant conditions on the individual right to have arms. 8 In 1181,
King Henry II issued the earliest known decree pertaining to the
right, the "Assize of Arms."39 The decree allowed all freemen to
keep arms, but only those "suited to [their] station[s] in life," and
only "to aid in the defense of the kingdom." 0 In 1285, King Ed-
ward I issued the Statute of Winchester,41 which required that all
freemen not only have arms, but also periodically train with arms
in the event that they were called upon to defend the kingdom.
42
The language of the statute thus suggests that its purpose was not
to create a broad individual right to have arms, but a narrow indi-
vidual right conditioned on the need for a militia to ensure the
kingdom's security.
4 3
Four subsequent legislative acts further demonstrate the con-
ditional nature of the common law right to arms. The Statute of
37. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 34 ("[T]he
right of an individual to keep and carry arms only exists in the context of contributing to a
'well-regulated militia.' "); Lund, supra note 2, at 122 (arguing that "[tihe Second Amend-
ment gives individuals a constitutional right to keep [and bear] such private arms as will
enable them to constitute a reasonable deterrent against government attempts to institute a
repressive political regime."). For a discussion of the plain meaning of the phrase "security
of a free state" in the Second Amendment, see infra part III.B.
38. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 7-14; Historiography, supra note 1, at 7-
24.
39. The Assize of Arms, reprinted in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 416 (David C.
Douglas ed., 1953); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 8.
40. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 8.
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Northhampton,4' issued by King Edward III in 1328, sharply nar-
rowed the scope of the individual right. The statute provided that
no man should "go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs,
Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor
in no part elsewhere. '45 Three centuries later, King James I re-
pealed the Statute of Winchester, 46 eliminating the requirement of
freemen to keep arms.47 James I also enacted a statute requiring
collection of all magazines of arms and provisions in a centralized
placed in each county.48 Seventy years later, Charles II issued a
statute that restricted possession of arms to noblemen and those
freemen owning land worth 100 pounds.49
The English Bill of Rights frequently is claimed to have estab-
lished a broad, individual right to bear arms.5 0 But the Bill's lan-
guage refutes such a claim: "[T]he subjects which are Protestants
may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as
allowed by law."51 The Bill restricted the rights to Protestants, and
guaranteed the right only insofar as the arms were (1) for defense,
44. Statute of Northhampton, 1938, 2 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.).
45. Id. This apparently complete proscription against traveling with arms suggests that
the right to "bear," or carry, arms was narrowly conditioned upon the need to defend the
kingdom. Indeed, the Statute of Northhampton frequently is cited as proof that no common
law right to arms ever existed. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 8; Weatherup,
supra note 16, at 965. For a discussion of the plain meaning of the term "bear" in the
second amendment, see infra part III.B.5.
46. Statute of Winchester, 1603, 1 Jam., ch. 25 (Eng.).
47. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 8.
48. Id. (citing 4 HENRY D. TRAiLL, SocIAL ENGLAND 42 (1895)).
49. An Act for the Better Preservation of the Game, and for Securing Warrens Not
Inclosed, and the Severall Fishings of this Realme, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 25 (Eng.);
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 9.
50. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 12-13 ("The opponents of gun regulation
commonly claim that Parliament was asserting [in the English Bill of Rights] the absolute
right of English citizens to carry arms.... Some commentators state that [this was done] to
ensure that a tyrannical monarch would never again be able to render the citizenry
helpless.").
The English Bill of Rights reads in part:
Whereas the late King James II did endeavor to subvert and extirpate the Protes-
tant religion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom by... raising and keeping
a standing army within this kingdom without the consent of Parliament and quar-
tering soldiers contrary to law, by causing several good subjects being Protestants
to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed and employed
contrary to law ... [therefore] ... [we] declare .. . that the subjects which are
Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as
allowed by law.
Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.) (quoted in Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12,
at 12) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
51. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 12 (quoting Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. 2,
ch. 2 (Eng.)).
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(2) suitable to the Protestants' conditions and (3) allowed by law.2
Finally, the emerging need for a standing army in seven-
teenth-century England also suggests that the common law guar-
anteed only a conditional, individual right to arms. Even though
the army of James I was handpicked, personally financed and more
than twice as large as the army of William of Orange, William suc-
cessfully "conquered" England in the Glorious Revolution of
1689.53 William's defeat of James I revealed three benefits of a
standing army over the old, militia-based defense system. First, a
standing army would allow England to protect its forces across Eu-
rope at a time of heightened risk of military involvement with
France and Holland.54 Second, since an invasion of England likely
would be spearheaded by French troops, a standing army afforded
England the important benefit of well drilled, technologically
equipped troops.5 Third, England's financial revolution during the
1690's made possible sufficient funding for a standing army.5
As the notion of a standing army gradually became more ac-
ceptable to English citizens,57 professional military forces gradually
supplanted the old, militia-based defense system. This supplanta-
tion, in turn, made less plausible the traditional justifications for
the individual right to keep and bear arms.58
2. Adoption of the Constitution of 1787. Initially, two
problems arise in interpreting the Second Amendment through
analysis of the debates on the adoption of the Constitution. First,
despite one commentator's assertion of "unanimity" in the Fram-
ers' understanding of the Second Amendment, 5 analysis of the
52. Id.
53. Historiography, supra note 1, at 13. James mustered more than twice the 12,000
troops that supported William. Id. Reportedly, dissention among James' officers, culminat-
ing in the conspiracy and defection to William of James' commander-in-chief, prevented
James from ever joining battle. Id. at n.41.
54. Id. at 13 ("For England to accept William also meant being drawn into the ongoing
struggle between Holland and France and facing the risk of James' return with a French
army.").
55. Id. at 14 ("[DIrill, for the first time in modern history became the precondition for
the military success .... ." (citation omitted)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id. Specifically, under the old, militia-based defense system, the individual right to
keep and bear arms was conditioned upon the necessity that all able-bodied freemen ensure
the security of the kingdom. Logically speaking, since standing armies gradually were sup-
planting the role of the militia system in ensuring the national defense, the individual right
to have arms was becoming more difficult to justify. See supra notes 38-57 and accompany-
ing text.
59. Kates, supra note 1, at 226 n.90.
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constitutional debates reveals the "quixotic nature" of any attempt
to demonstrate that all the Framers had a single understanding.0
Second, the adoption debates did not discuss specifically the right
to keep and bear arms.6 1 Nevertheless, analysis of the adoption de-
bates reveals the constitutional "conflict" between the federal gov-
ernment and the states regarding the militia power, which eventu-
ally led to the adoption of the Second Amendment. 2
The adoption debates demonstrate the Framers' preference for
a conditional, individual right to keep and bear arms. Some com-
mentators cite James Madison for the proposition that the Fram-
ers recognized a broad individual right to keep and bear arms.6
Specifically, they cite a short passage from The Federalist, in
which Madison wrote that Americans possess the "advantage of
60. Historiography, supra note 1, at 2. Of course, it still is possible to derive and define
the original understanding of the Second Amendment. Analysis is required not only of the
text itself, but also secondary materials such as the debates on the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, inasmuch as they reflect the objective intent of the Framers at the time of the
adoption.
61. See DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES 109-745 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at
20. However, the debates focused in depth on the role of the militia and the foreseeable
needs and risks of a standing army. Id. Specifically, the Federalists argued that in order to
have an effective militia, extensive national authority over the militias was necessary to en-
sure more national uniformity in arms, discipline and training. Id. at 21.
The Anti-Federalists raised three concerns. First, they were concerned that the national
government might take control of the states' militias and use them to oppress the states. Id.
at 22. Second, they were concerned that if the national government were given the authority
to arm, discipline and train the militias, then Congress might neglect the militias, thereby
rendering them useless to the states. Id. Finally, the Anti-Federalists were concerned that
the states would not have concurrent authority to arm, discipline and train their own mili-
tias if Congress were to neglect them. Id.
The concerns of the Anti-Federalists were addressed in the final constitutional distribu-
tion of militia power. The national government was given the power to organize, arm, disci-
pline and call forth the militia. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cls. 15, 16. The states were given the
power to appoint officers for and train the militia. Id. cl. 16; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note
12, at 23.
62. This unsatisfactory relationship is reflected in the constitutional text. See U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
63. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 2, at 648-49, 652 (arguing Madison's desire for an
extended republic in which all Americans possessed arms supports broad, individual right to
keep and bear arms); Lund, supra note 2, at 107 n.9 (arguing Madison's original plan to
insert each provision of Bill of Rights into appropriate section of Constitution supports "in-
dividual interpretation" of Second Amendment, since Madison intended to insert right to
keep and bear arms provision into Article I, § 9, "which is the principal 'individual rights'
section of the original Constitution."); cf. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 32 ("Con-
gress did not intend to confer a broad 'individual' right to carry arms .... [I]f Madison and
Congress had intended to create some broad individual right to weapons, they could have
chosen language which clearly did so.").
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being armed" over the "kingdoms of Europe[,] ... [whose] govern-
ments are afraid to trust [their] people with arms. ' 64 However, this
passage must be considered in its larger context, namely,
Madison's belief that the proposed federal government could not
possibly accumulate a large enough standing army to establish an
oppressive tyranny over the people:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed;
and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it
would not be going too far to say that the State governments with the peo-
ple on their side would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to
which ... a standing army can be carried in any country does not exceed
one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part
of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the
United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
To these would be opposed a militia amounting to nearly half a million citi-
zens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among them-
selves, fighting for their common liberties and.., united.., and conducted
by governments possessing their affections and confidence [the states]. It
may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be
conquered by such a proportion of regular troops .... Besides the [individ-
ual American's] advantage of being armed .... the existence of subordinate
governments, to which the people are attached and by which the militia
officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition
85
Madison actually was suggesting that the "advantage" of Ameri-
cans being armed was that individual Americans may, if necessary,
exercise their right to keep and bear arms in order to erect a bar-
rier against any enterprises of federal ambition that would estab-
lish a tyranny over the people.6
Alexander Hamilton's writings in The Federalist also support
the theory of a conditional, individual right to keep and bear
arms." Hamilton wrote extensively about the necessity of standing
armies and the alleged risks they posed to the state militias. 8 Spe-
cifically, Hamilton addressed the issue whether adequate constitu-
tional provisions had been made against the existence of standing
armies in peacetime.6 9
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
65. Id. at 321-22.
66. Id.
67. See id. Nos. 24-29 (Alexander Hamilton). Commentators rarely cite Hamilton on
the Second Amendment. Yet, Hamilton's writings on the relationship between the proposed
federal standing army and the states' militias provide important insight into the constitu-
tional concerns that gave rise to the adoption of the Second Amendment. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. No. 24, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13
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Hamilton first argued that the use of standing armies for the
defense of the nation's western border was more practical than re-
liance on the state militias. He observed that "[p]revious to the
[American] Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western
frontier. ' 70 He reasoned that standing armies proportionate to the
risk of disturbance were necessary, because protection of the fron-
tier was a permanent military obligation, and "[t]he militia would
not long.., submit to be dragged from their occupations and fam-
ilies to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound
peace.
' 71
Later, Hamilton argued that standing armies would ensure a
more effective defense of the nation: "[C]ases are likely to occur
under our government.., which will sometimes render a [standing
army] essential to the security of the society .... Because war is
a "science" that is acquired and perfected only through diligence,
perseverance, time and practice, a war conducted against "a regu-
lar and disciplined [foreign] army can only be successfully con-
ducted by a force of the same kind," namely, a standing army.7
s
Hamilton's emphasis on the practical and "scientific" benefits
of standing armies over militias made reliance on the English com-
mon-law justification for an individual right to arms, i.e., defense
of the country from foreign invasion, an implausible justification
for an American individual right to keep and bear arms. He ex-
plained the justification for a conditional, individual right to keep
and bear arms in the new nation. If ever the federal government
should conspire to "subvert the liberties" of the people through
the use of a large, standing army,
4
there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of
self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and
which against the usurpations of the national rulers [the citizens may take
up arms] with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the
rulers of an individual [s]tate.
75
Hamilton argued that the best protection against a standing army
("Congress shall have Power... To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years [and] .... Congress shall have
Power... To provide and maintain a Navy[.]"); see also supra text accompanying notes 18-
19.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
71. Id.
72. Id. No. 25, at 167.
73. Id. at 166.
74. Id. No. 26, at 172.
75. Id. No. 28, at 180.
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is the individual citizen's right to keep and bear arms. However,
this individual right is conditioned upon the rare need of citizens
to defend themselves against federal government attempts to sub-
vert individual liberties and establish a tyranny.1 6
When taken in proper context, the writings of Madison and
Hamilton reflect the Framers' predisposition to create a condi-
tional, individual right to keep and bear arms. The evolution of the
ideas expressed by Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist con-
tinued through the Second Amendment's ratification.
3. Ratification of the Second Amendment. If the Congress
had intended to convey a broad individual right to keep and bear
arms, then it could have used language that expressly conveyed
such a broad right.7 7 But Congress had no such intention. In-
stead, the final version of the Second Amendment was the product
of three distinct state models which, when combined, created a
conditional, individual right to keep and bear arms.
James Madison studied each of the twelve state constitutions
before drafting the federal Bill of Rights. 79 The Second Amend-
ment was the product of three state models, exemplified by the
arms provisions in the Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
Declarations of Rights.80
76. See id. No. 29, at 185.
77. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 32. Indeed, the Second Amendment might
have used the following language to create a broad individual right: "The individual right of
the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property,
or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein
shall prevent the [Congress] from defining the lawful use of arms." See UTAH CONST. art. I,
§ 6. Even though the Utah legislature retains the power to define the lawful use of arms, the
Utah Constitution expressly conveys an individual right to keep and bear arms not only for
the "security ... of ... the State;" but also for the defense of persons and property. Id.
The West Virginia Constitution provides that "[a] person has the right to keep and
bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recre-
ational use." W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22 (emphasis added). Significantly, none of the con-
ventions, debates or other writings preceding the ratification of the Second Amendment
discuss a right to have weapons for self-defense, hunting or recreational use. Ehrman &
Henigan, supra note 12, at 33.
78. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 31-34.
79. Historiography, supra note 1, at 47 (citing IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER
OF THE CONSTITUTION 264 (1950)). Madison's role as "father of the national bill of rights"
was much more an editing role than a drafting role. Id. at 53. On a macro-level, Madison's
responsibility was first to select a "hard core" of usable proposals from the hundreds of
redundant, even questionable proposals; second, to single out the most desirable proposals;
and finally, to assemble the proposed rights into a series of amendments. Id. On the micro-
level, Madison had the same responsibility as to each amendment. See id. at 54-59.
80. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 15-17; Historiography, supra note 1, at
33. Of course, each of the twelve original state constitutions had an important influence on
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The Virginia legislature rejected Thomas Jefferson's proposal
to create a broad individual right to arms.81 Instead, the legislature
adopted George Mason's more conservative proposal, which
provided:
[A] well-regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to
arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State; that Standing
Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and
that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to and
governed by the civil power.82
Significantly, this militia-based provision does not provide for an
individual right to arms, but focuses on the necessity of a "well-
regulated militia" and proscribes standing armies in peacetime.83
Even though the Pennsylvania Declaration was heavily influ-
enced by the Virginia model, 4 the Pennsylvania legislature gave
greater scope to individual rights than its Virginia counterpart.
8 5
Specifically, Pennsylvania departed from the Virginia model in
adopting the nation's first arms provision. 6 The Pennsylvania
Declaration provided:
[Tihe people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and
the state; and as standing armies in times of peace are dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be kept up; And that the military should be kept under
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power."
the final language of the Second Amendment. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 15-16.
The Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts constitutions, however, contain the prototyp-
ical arms provisions on which the amendment was based. Historiography, supra note 1, at
33.
81. See Historiography, supra note 1, at 34 ("[Jefferson's] proposal did not mention
the militia or its role in a republic, but did include a clearly individual right to arms: 'No
freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms.' ").
82. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 16 (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights,
art. 13) (emphasis added).
83. Conversely, Jefferson's proposal did not mention the militia or its necessity for the
security of the nation. Historiography, supra note 1, at 34.
The Virginia model resembles closely the Militia Clause of the Second Amendment. If
the Second Amendment were based solely on the militia-based Virginia model, then the
position of state's right theorists would be strengthened, since the Virginia model does not
mention an individual right to arms. See supra part I.
84. See JOHN ADAMS, 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY 391 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961)
("[The Pennsylvania] Bill of Rights is almost verbatim from that of Virginia."); Ehrman &
Henigan, supra note 12, at 16-17 (recognizing that except for arms provision, Pennsylvania
Declaration virtually is taken verbatim from Virginia model). Indeed, the Pennsylvania
drafters studied copies of the Virginia Declaration before drafting their own state's declara-
tion. Historiography, supra note 1, at 38.
85. Historiography, supra note 1, at 38.
86. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 16.
87. Id. at 17 (quoting Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, art. XIII)(emphasis added).
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Unlike the Virginia model, this provision expressly establishes an
individual right to bear arms for defense of persons and the state.,
Moreover, the Pennsylvania legislature chose not to recognize the
necessity of a "well-regulated Militia" for the "safe defence of a
free State."8'9
Even though the Massachusetts Declaration also was influ-
enced by the Virginia model,90 the Massachusetts legislature took
the Virginia model one step further. The legislature combined Vir-
ginia's militia-based provision with its own modified individual-
right provision in order to create a conditional, individual right.
The Massachusetts Declaration provided that "[t]he people have a
right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence."91 Thus,
the Massachusetts model not only expanded upon the language of
the Philadelphia Declaration, by providing for an individual right
to "keep" as well as to "bear" arms; but also conditioned the indi-
vidual right on the need for a militia to ensure "the common de-
fense" and "private self-defense.
'92
Madison considered the Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachu-
setts models in drafting the Second Amendment. In so doing,
Madison selected neither the militia-based Virginia model nor the
individual-right model. Instead, he settled on language consistent
with, if not wholly based upon, the hybrid Massachusetts model:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State [Virginia militia-based model], the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed [Pennsylvania individ-
88. Id.
89. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 16 (quoting Virginia Declaration of
Rights, art. 13). For a discussion of the political and philosophical differences among Vir-
ginia's "Harringtonians," Pennsylvania's "Radicals" and the Jeffersonian model of universal
suffrage, see Historiography, supra note 1, at 34-39.
90. Historiography, supra note 1, at 40.
91. Id. at 41 n.173 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 40-41. The writings of John Adams, chief author of the Massachusetts Decla-
ration, reflect his belief in the need for an individual, but "qualified," or conditional, right to
keep and bear arms:
To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion, ex-
cept in private self-defence, or by partial orders of towns, countries or districts of
a state, is to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that lib-
erty can be enjoyed by no man; it is a dissolution of the government. The funda-
mental law of the militia is, that it be created, directed and commanded by the
laws, and ever for the support of the laws.
6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (Charles F.
Adams ed., 1851), quoted in Historiography, supra note 1, at 41 (emphasis added). Hence,
Adams sought to define at once the breadth of the individual right to keep and bear arms,
and the scope of such right, namely, for "the common defense" and "private self-defense."
See Historiography, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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ual-right model]."9s
B. The Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment's historical context demonstrates
that the right to keep and bear arms is a narrow individual right
that is conditioned on the necessity of a militia to the security of a
free state. Even though "bright boundary lines cannot always be
drawn, '8 4 analysis of the Second Amendment's language is re-
quired to explain the scope of the individual right.
e5
1. "Militia." George Mason provides the eighteenth-century
understanding of the term "militia": "I ask, Who are the militia?
They consist now of the whole people, except a few public of-
ficers."9' The militia was not a select military force9 7 but the entire
adult male citizenry, who were allowed and often required to pos-
sess and carry their own arms for the security of the state.98
This inclusive interpretation of the term "militia" is further
supported by the language of the first national militia act.9 9 The
act defined the militia broadly to include all able-bodied, white
male citizens ages eighteen to forty-five. 100 Even though the defini-
93. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
94. Guarantees to Arms, supra note 14, at 59 & n.5, 60.
95. See Historiography, supra note 1, at 42.
96. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 386, quoted in Guaran-
tees to Arms, supra note 14, at 63 (emphasis added). Mason's understanding was consistent
with the prevailing view in seventeenth-century England. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note
12, at 11.
97. As Mr. Kates argues, the Framers' eighteenth-century understanding of the term
"militia" undercuts the state's right theory of the Second Amendment:
The... argument against an individual right [to keep and bear arms] states that
the [A]mendment uses "militia" in the sense of a formal military force separate
from the people. But this is plainly wrong. The Founders stated what they meant
by "militia" on various occasions. Invariably they defined it in some phrase like
"the whole body of the people," while their references to the organized-military-
unit usage of militia, which they called a "select militia," were strongly pejorative.
Kates, supra note 1, at 216 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Since one purpose of the Second Amendment was to arm the "militia," the Framers
guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms to all those comprising the militia, namely, all
able-bodied males. Id. at 216-17; see Weatherup, supra note 16, at 992 (noting that Madison
himself used the terms "militia" and "people" synonymously).
98. Guarantees to Arms, supra note 14, at 63-68; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at
11; Kates, supra note 1, at 214, 216-17; Lund, supra note 2, at 106 & n.6; cf. Ehrman &
Henigan, supra note 12, at 24 ("[I]n the context of the Constitution, the militia was viewed
as a state-organized, state-run body; it was not simply a term for the citizenry at large.").
99. First Militia Act, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 271 (1792); see Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12,
at 35-36; Historiography, supra note 1, at 27; Kates, supra note 1, at 216.
100. Section 1, 1 Stat. at 271; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 35; Kates, supra
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tion was narrowed by the second militia act,10 1 the language of the
first militia act reflects the Framers' original understanding of the
term "militia."
Moreover, the original understanding renders the state's right
theory questionable. 102 The Framers believed that a militia-"the
whole of the people," possessed of their individually-owned
arms-was necessary for the security of a free state, and guaran-
teed the right to keep and bear arms not to the state, but to all
qualified individuals.103 This individual right was subject to the
qualification of the phrase preceding "militia" in the Second
Amendment: "well regulated.' 10 4
2. "Well Regulated." For the Framers in the eighteenth cen-
tury, a "well regulated" militia meant one "properly disciplined,"
not "government controlled." 05 The Framers recognized that even
note 1, at 216. The Act also required each militiaman to possess his own arms. Section 1, 1
Stat. at 271; Historiography, supra note 1, at 27 ("[The] Act required [each militiaman] to
possess a rifle or musket (or, if enrolled in cavalry or artillery units, pistols and a sword)
101. The Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). In contrast to the First Militia Act's
definition of militia, the Dick Act provided for a militia that consisted of less than all able-
bodied, military-age males. Id. § 3; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 37. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has adopted the original understanding of the term "militia" as reflected
in the First Militia Act. See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). For a discussion of
Miller and judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment, see infra part III.C.2.
102. See supra part II.A.; see also supra text accompanying notes 16-27.
103. See Kates, supra note 1, at 217-18. Significantly, nothing in the history or lan-
guage of the Second Amendment indicates that the Framers intended to extend the right to
keep and bear arms to women.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
105. Lund, supra note 2, at 107 & n.8. As Lund argues:
The fact that the Framers referred to a "well regulated militia" lends apparent
support to the collective right interpretation [of the Second Amendment], but the
reference indicates only that the Framers intended for the militia to be regulated
in some way, as for example, by being organized into formal military units or by
being comprised of individuals already familiar with the principal instruments of
military combat.
Id. at 107 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, the plain language of the Second
Amendment does not imply merely a "right of the states to maintain organized military
forces," id. at 105, but an individual right to arms which, in turn, requires some degree of
regulation.
For further analysis of the "collective," or state's right theory of the Second Amend-
ment, see supra part L.A and text accompanying note 37; see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 12, at 21-22 (observing that "the Federalists frequently tried to turn Anti-Federalist
fears about [a standing] army around, arguing that by ... maintaining a well-disciplined,
uniformly trained, and effective militia, Congress would have less need to raise a large
standing army"). For a discussion of the risks posed by a standing army, see supra part
II.A.2.
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if the militia were comprised of all able-bodied male citizens,108
arms and organization were necessary in order to fulfill the central
purpose of the Second Amendment: to ensure the security of a free
state.1 0 7 In his first annual address, President George Washington
argued that "[a] free people ought not only to be armed, but disci-
plined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requi-
site."108 The Framers' intention to discipline the militia is manifest
106. See supra part II.B.1.
107. See Guarantees to Arms, supra note 14, at 23-24. As one delegate explained at the
Constitutional Convention: "[B]y organizing, the Committee meant proportioning the of-
ficers and men-by arming, specifying the kind, size, and calibre of arms-and by disciplin-
ing, prescribing the manual exercise . " Historiography, supra note 1, at 26 & n.102
(citing 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 344 (2d ed., 1836) (1966)).
It might be argued that since the Framers intended a properly disciplined militia, see
supra text accompanying note 97, the Second Amendment was intended not to provide an
individual right to keep and bear arms, but rather a right of the states to strictly organize
their own militias in order to defend the nation from external attack.
Such an argument fails for two reasons. First, the Framers already had provided in
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution for the national defense. Specifically, the Framers had
provided Congress with the power "[t]o raise and support Armies," U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8,
cl. 12; "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," id. at cl. 13; "[tio make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id. at cl. 14; "[t]o provide for calling
forth the Militia," id. at cl. 15; and "[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia .... reserving to the States respectively, . . . the Authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress," id. at cl. 16. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 18-19. Since the Framers already had provided in the Constitution for the national
defense and the states' authority to train the militia under Congressional authority, similar
provisions in the Second Amendment would have been superfluous.
Second, as Mr. Hardy argues:
Provisions authorizing Congress to provide for the arming and organizing of the
national militia were seen as allowing it to require that all citizens possess arms of
uniform caliber and conform to a standard of drill. In practice, while various ad-
ministrations prepared detailed plans along these lines, Congress refused to enact
them.
Historiography, supra note 1, at 26 & n.103 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). If Con-
gress had intended the phrase "well regulated" in the Second Amendment to mean strictly
organized, armed and disciplined by the states, then one might expect that Congress would
have enacted the necessary provisions. The fact that Congress did not enact such provisions
suggests that the Second Amendment was intended not to provide a right of the states to
organize their own militias, but rather to provide an individual right to keep and bear arms.
For discussion of the meaning of the phrase "security of a free state" in the Second
Amendment, see infra part II.B.3.
108. George Washington, First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 57 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). Indeed,
Washington considered militia legislation to be "an object of primary importance[,] whether
viewed in reference to the national security[,] to the satisfaction of the community or to the
preservation of order." George Washington, Third Annual Address (Oct. 25, 1791), in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 99 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897); see Historiography, supra note 1, at 26.
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in the provisions of the First Militia Act of 1792, which required
all able-bodied males of military age to individually possess
arms.
09
Thus far, analysis of the Second Amendment's plain meaning
suggests that a "well-regulated militia" is all able-bodied, white
male citizens ages eighteen to forty-five,"' possessed of arms and
"properly disciplined,""' "'especially when young, [on] how to use
them.' 112 A "well-regulated militia" was intended to ensure "the
security of a free state.""13 The plain meaning of this latter phrase
reveals the central purpose of the Second Amendment.
3. "The Security of a Free State". The central purpose of
the Second Amendment was to ensure that individual citizens
would be privately armed in order to "constitute a reasonable de-
terrent" against federal government "attempts to institute a re-
pressive political regime.""' 4
Anti-Federalists feared" 5 not only the prospect of a standing
army," 6 but also "the proposed transfer of state authority over the
militia."" 7 Since the anti-Federalists believed that disarmament of
the civilian population was the prerequisite for government's op-
109. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98; Lund, supra note 2, at 107.
110. See supra part II.B.1.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
112. Historiography, supra note 1, at 51 (quoting RICHARD H. LEE, LETTERS FROM THE
FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 124 (Walter H. Bennet ed., 1978)).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
114. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 24 ("[T]he [S]econd [A]mendment is aimed
at ensuring that all private citizens would be armed, and thus able to rise up in revolt
against any government action perceived by the masses as 'tyrannical.'" (footnote omitted);
Lund, supra note 3, at 122 ("The Second Amendment at least gives individuals a constitu-
tional right to keep such private arms as will enable then to constitute a reasonable deter-
rent against government attempts to institute a repressive political regime.") (emphasis
added). See Historiography, supra note 1, at 24, 27; Kates, supra note 1, at 267-73; Robert
E. Shalhoupe, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1986, at 125, 133 [hereinafter Armed Citizen in the Early Republic].
For discussion of the plain meaning of the word "arms" in the Second Amendment as
that term defines the scope of a "reasonable deterrent," see Lund, supra note 2, at 122; see
infra part ll.B.6.
115. As Mr. Hardy argues, the fear of an oppressive federal government, and the belief
in the need for a well-regulated militia in order to prevent tyranny, dates back to pre-revo-
lutionary America: "[t]o Harrington, an army was too unstable to support any government;
to Neville, it was so stable as to support a tyrannical one; to many colonists, it was capable
of corrupting a republican government into a tyranny." Historiography, supra note 1, at 24
(emphasis added).
116. See supra part II.A.2.
117. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 21. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16; see
ELLIOT, supra note 107, at 440; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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pression of the people, 18 they viewed the militia "as the means for
defending themselves from an oppressive federal government, par-
ticularly one which was providing itself with means to establish an
army.,"1
9
Federalists shared the concerns of the anti-Federalists. 120
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton both argued that a "well
regulated militia" effectively would ensure "the security of a free
state" by preventing a federal tyranny.
12 1
James Madison, writing in The Federalist,'22 argued that the
federal government could not possibly accumulate a large enough
standing army to establish a tyranny over the people. Even though
a "regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country," and
"entirely at the devotion of the federal government," would be
formed;123 the "[s]tate governments with the people on their side
would be able to repel the danger.' 1 24 Indeed, the militia, "fighting
for their common liberties[,] . . .united ... conducted by [state]
government possessing their affections and confidence ...could
[n]ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops."'12 5
Madison ultimately argued that the American "advantage of being
armed" was that individuals may, if necessary, exercise their right
to keep and bear arms in order to erect a "barrier" against those
"enterprises of [federal] ambition" that might establish a tyranny
over the people.
126
Alexander Hamilton also extolled the American advantage of
being armed as the means for preventing federal tyranny. If ever
the federal government should conspire to subvert the liberties of
individual citizens through use of a standing army, "there is ... no
resource left but in the exercise of that original right of self-de-
fense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and
which against the usurpations of the national rulers[,]" individual
118. See Lund, supra note 2, at 111-22.
119. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 21 (citing 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION 384-88 (1974)). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
120. See supra part lI.A.2.
121. See supra parts II.B.1 and II.B.2; see supra text accompanying note 22.
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Even
though The Federalist was published nearly four years before the adoption of the Second
Amendment, see supra text accompanying note 22, the writings of Madison and Hamilton
reflect in large part the Framers' belief that the militia would prevent establishment of a
federal tyranny through oppressive use of a standing army. See generally THE FEDERALIST
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cls. 12-16.





citizens may take up arms. 127
The central purpose of a well-regulated militia was to ensure
the right of individual citizens to defend themselves against any
federal government attempt to subvert their liberties through es-
tablishment of a tyranny. 12 Thus the Framers expressly condi-
tioned the individual right to keep and bear arms on the need to
ensure the "security of a free state,' 129 i.e., to prevent the estab-
lishment of a federal tyranny.
The Second Amendment rule might be stated as follows:
where one keeps and bears arms specifically in order to defend
oneself against federal government attempts to establish a tyranny,
the Second Amendment protects one's conduct. Otherwise, one's
conduct is not constitutionally protected and may be more strictly
regulated.
4. "Right'30 of the People." The "right of the people" in the
Second Amendment is guaranteed to all individual citizens; it is
not a collective right guaranteed to the sovereign citizenry.' 3 ' Anal-
ysis of the language of the Bill of Rights and the Militia Clause
supports this interpretation." 2
The language of the Bill of Rights supports the conclusion
that "people" in the Second Amendment refers to individual citi-
zens. The First Amendment, for example, provides that "Congress
shall make no law.., abridging.., the right of the people peacea-
bly to assemble .... 's This Amendment guarantees an individ-
ual right, since "it would approach the frivolous to read the assem-
127. Id. No. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 28, at 180.
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
130. The term "right" in the Second Amendment is the only term that has not gener-
ated controversy. Since the meaning of the term "right" is no more ambiguous in the Sec-
ond Amendment than in any other Constitutional provision, its meaning will not be dis-
cussed here.
However, this Comment does argue that the individual right of the Second Amendment
is expressly limited by the plain language of the Militia Clause. See supra parts II.B.1-3.
131. Historiography, supra note 1, at 4, 57, 59 (arguing that "people" in Second
Amendment guarantees individual right to own and carry arms); Kates, supra note 1, at 218
(arguing that "people" in First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to
individuals, not collective sovereign citizenry); Levinson, supra note 2, 645-46 (arguing that
text of Bill of Rights itself supports conclusion that "people" refers to individuals); Lund,
supra note 2, at 107 (arguing that "people" refers to individuals, not collective right of
states to have militias); cf. Cress, supra note 9, at 31 (arguing that "people" refers to collec-
tive right of people as sovereign citizenry); O'Donnell, supra note 35, at 503-04 (arguing that
"people" likely refers to collective, not individual right).
132. See supra parts II.B.1-3.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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bly and petition clause as referring only to the right of state
legislatures to meet and pass a remonstrance directed to Congress
or the President against some governmental act."'1 4
The Fourth Amendment provides a "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects . . . ."I This
Amendment also guarantees an individual right, since it ensures
that the privacy of individuals will not be violated except where a
search or seizure is reasonable or a warrant is supported by proba-
ble cause. 13 6 The Ninth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people,"'37 also
uses the word "people" in the "natural," individual sense.138
The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States ... are reserved to the States . . . or to
the people."'3 9 As Professor Levinson argues, the interpretation of
this Amendment's language is somewhat "trickier:' 140
Concededly, it would be possible to read the Tenth Amendment as sug-
gesting only an ultimate right of revolution by the collective people should
the "states" stray too far from their designated role of protecting the rights
of the people. This reading flows directly from the social contract theory of
the state. (But, of course, many of these rights are held by individuals).
141
Even if the Tenth Amendment directly reserves only collective
rights of the people, the Amendment reserves an individual right,
since the right is held collectively by all individuals. 142 Moreover,
since the Tenth Amendment "explicitly differentiate[s] between
'states' and 'the people' in terms of retained rights,' 43 the Amend-
ment likely reserves rights to both the states and individuals.
4 4
Since the term "people" guarantees individual rights in the
First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the Framers likely
used the term similarly in the Second Amendment to guarantee
the right to keep and bear arms to all individual citizens. Other-
wise, an incongruous textual proposition must be adopted: The
Framers used the term "people" in the First, Fourth, Ninth and
134. Levinson, supra note 2, at 645.
135. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. amend. IX (emphasis added).
138. Kates, supra note 1, at 218; see Levinson, supra note 2, at 645.
139. U.S. CONsT. amend. X (emphasis added).
140. Levinson, supra note 2, at 645.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Tenth Amendments to mean individual citizens, but used the
same phrase in the Second Amendment to mean either a collective
right of the sovereign citizenry to arms, or a right of the states to
have organized military units. If the Framers had intended the lat-
ter, then they would have used specific language to describe such a
right.
145
The language of the Militia Clause also supports the conclu-
sion that the term "people" refers to individual citizens. 146 The
purpose of the Militia Clause was to ensure that all able-bodied
individuals (the "militia") possessed arms and were properly disci-
plined ("well regulated") on how to use them, so that they might
defend against any federal government attempt to subvert individ-
ual liberties through establishment of a tyranny ("the security of a
free state").147 Since "militia" actually means all able-bodied indi-
viduals, not an organized military unit,148 the term "people" in the
Right to Arms Clause also refers to individuals. Since "well regu-
lated" means properly disciplined on how to use arms, not govern-
ment controlled, 49 the Framers contemplated that the "people"
would individually possess and use arms. And, since the purpose of
the Second Amendment was to ensure the right of individual citi-
zens to defend against federal tyranny, the "people" individually
must have the right to keep and bear arms. °50
The plain meaning of the phrase "right of the people" in the
Second Amendment reflects the Framers' intention to guarantee
an individual, not collective, right to keep and bear arms. By "keep
and bear," the Framers meant that two distinct forms of conduct
shall not be infringed.
5. "Keep and Bear." The Framers guaranteed individuals
the right not only to "bear" arms when defending against federal
tyranny, but also to "keep" arms when defense was unnecessary. 151
The Pennsylvania individual right model supplied the right to bear
145. See supra text accompanying note 17. For example, the Framers might have pro-
vided for the collective right of the people to keep and bear arms. The Framers also might
simply have adopted the militia-based Virginia model as the Second Amendment. See supra
part II.A.3.
146. See supra parts 3.B.1-3.
147. See supra parts ll.B.1-3.
148. See supra part lI.B.1.
149. See supra part II.B.2.
150. See supra part II.B.3. Notwithstanding that the term "people" means individuals,
nothing in the history of the Second Amendment suggests that ownership of arms must
extend to ex-convicts, the mentally impaired or minors. See Kates, supra note 1, at 210.
151. See supra part H.A.3.
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arms,'52 while the hybrid Massachusetts model supplied the right
to keep arms.153
The Framers' use of the phrase "to bear" arms initially sup-
ports the "state's right" theory of the Second Amendment. 5 4 In-
deed, "contemporary statutory usage shows eighteenth-century
writers using 'bear' [only] in reference to militiamen carrying their
arms when mustered to duty[] ... ."'" Thus, if the Framers had
used only the phrase "to bear," the Second Amendment would
"protect the carrying of arms outside the home only in the course
of militia service. ' ' 56
As Mr. Kates observes:
[c]olonial statutes did require militiamen to "keep" arms in their homes,
but they also required the over-aged, seamen and others, exempt from mili-
tia service to "keep" arms in their homes .... The one context in which
"keep" was not used was as a description of arms possession by public agen-
cies (as opposed to individuals) . . .
The term "keep" does not import a right of the states to have or-
ganized militias, 5 nor is it limited to military service. 15 9 Instead,
this term refers to an individual right to possess arms. 160 Thus, one
who exercises one's right to "keep" arms also may exercise one's
right to "bear" such arms in order to defend herself against federal
government attempts to establish a tyranny.'
6'
152. See supra part II.A.3; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 17 (quoting PENN.
DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. XII); Historiography, supra note 1, at 52, 56.
153. See Historiography, supra note 1, at 40, 56 n.173 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art.
XVII). The Massachusetts Constitution guaranteed the right "to keep and to bear arms"
Id.; see supra part H.A.3.
154. Kates, supra note 1, at 219 (discussing the argument put forth by Professor
Levin); see supra part I.A.
155. Kates, supra note 1, at 219; see John Smith, The Constitutional Right to Keep
and Bear Arms 42-55 (1959) (unpublished thesis, Harvard Law School) (arguing extensive
statutory review indicates "bear" generally did refer to carrying of arms by militiamen);
John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 148 (1971).
156. Kates, supra note 1, at 219.
157. Id. (quoting Smith, supra note 155, at 49 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
158. As Mr. Kates argues:
If the Framers' only concern had been to protect the militia's right to have arms
when actually mustered, "to bear" would have sufficed. The words "to bear" take
on meaning only if what is being protected is the individual's own arms, rather
than those arms of the state that would be dispensed to him from an armory
whenever the militia was mustered.
Id. at 220 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See U.S. CONsT. amend. H (providing the right to keep and bear arms); see supra
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The phrase "keep and bear" in the Second Amendment refers
to the individual right not only to possess ("keep") arms, but also
to carry and use ("bear") such arms. The last five words of the
Second Amendment 1 2 suggest limitations on the conditional, indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms.
6. "Arms." Little in the Second Amendment's history sug-
gests that the Framers contemplated a specific class of weapons as
"arms." Several commentators have seized upon this ambiguity in
order to make an important argument: the Framers did not intend
for individuals to keep and bear any and all types of weapons as
"arms."'1 3 Nor, however, did the Framers intend an overly restric-
tive definition of the term "arms." Many of the Framers partici-
pated in the enactment of the original Militia Act of 1792,164 which
required able-bodied individuals to possess "a rifle or musket" or,
"if enrolled in cavalry or artillery units, pistols and a sword[]
.... ,," Thus the Framers intended the term "arms" to included
certain basic types of weapons both accessible to individuals at
large and adequate for individual self-defense. The modern
equivalents of such weapons are handguns and rifles. Both types of
weapons essentially were specified in the Act and, today, are read-
ily accessible and adequate for self-defense.
The class of arms that the Framers contemplated might be
limited further by implication of the phrase "keep and bear" in the
Second Amendment. e6 "Because what is being guaranteed is an
individual right to keep and bear arms, the arms could only be
[borne] if the ordinary individual could conveniently lift and trans-
port them about with his body.' 6 7 Such a limitation is grounded
in the specific language of the Second Amendment and eliminates
most paramilitary weapons, including bazookas, missiles, flame-
part II.B.3.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("arms shall not be infringed").
163. Historiography, supra note 1, at 62 n.270 (arguing that if the militia component of
Second Amendment actually had substantive meaning, citizens might have enforceable duty
to "purchase and stockpile M-14's, M-16's or any other standard military firearm ....");
Kates, supra note 1, at 210 (inquiring why all types of arms, including "artillery, flame-
throwers, [and] machine guns [are not permitted under the Second Amendment].");
O'Donnell, supra note 35, at 503-04 (arguing that if individual right to arms were absolute,
the 'logical' conclusion would be that individuals have right to own "machine guns, missiles
or whatever 'arms' he or she wishes to possess.").
164. Section 1, 1 Stat. at 271; see supra part II.B.1; see supra text accompanying notes
109-11.
165. Section 1, 1 Stat. at 271; see Historiography, supra note 1, at 27.
166. Kates, supra note 1, at 220 n.62.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
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throwers, tanks and planes.""8
The term "arms" includes basic weapons, such as handguns
and rifles, which are accessible to individuals and adequate for in-
dividual self-defense. The phrase "keep and bear" further implies
that permissible "arms" are those which one could conveniently
"bear" on one's person.
7. "Shall not be Infringed." Even though the last phrase of
the Second Amendment suggests that the individual right to keep
and bear arms "shall not (ever) be infringed," no right in the fed-
eral Bill of Rights is absolute. " The language of the Second
Amendment limits the individual right to keep and bear arms.
First, the individual right to keep and bear arms is limited by
the Militia Clause: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free state ..... ,,170 This language expressly conditions
the individual right to keep and bear arms on the necessity for
168. Concerning paramilitary weapons such as machine guns and other assault weap-
ons, Mr. Lund suggests that "reasonable government regulation of firearms is compatible
with the intent of the Framers and the language of the Second Amendment." Lund, supra
note 2, at 130 (emphasis added). Even though a standard of reasonableness would be plausi-
ble as a matter of public policy, it has no support in the history or language of the Second
Amendment. However, it is equally true that no constitutional right is absolute and, there-
fore, Congress may limit the individual right to keep and bear arms where a compelling
government interest exists.
Recently, the House of Representatives passed a bill which would ban several dozen
types of automatic assault weapons. The Senate previously had passed a similar bill. If the
President signs a revised bill as expected, such a law probably would be constitutional.
Nothing in the history or language of the Second Amendment suggests that the Framers
intended to (1) include paramilitary weapons within the scope of the term "arms" in the
Second Amendment; or (2) restrict the power of Congress to limit the definition of "arms"
in light of a compelling government interest in ensuring public safety.
169. The First Amendment, for example, provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech[] ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Despite this language, how-
ever, the First Amendment right of free speech is not absolute. As Justice Holmes stated for
a unanimous Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the "character of every
act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a [crowded] theatre and
causing a panic." Id. at 52
Other rights afforded in the Bill of Rights are similarly limited. For example, the
Fourth Amendment provides a right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, but a warrant is not
required in exigent circumstances. The Fifth Amendment affords a privilege against self-
incrimination, U.S. CONST. amend. V, but evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-
chief may be used to impeach a defendant. And, the Sixth Amendment provides a right to
counsel to the accused "[iun all criminal prosecutions," U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, but the right
does not extend to pre-custodial interrogations. See also Dowlut, Guarantees to Arms,
supra note 14, at 68.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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individuals to defend themselves against federal government at-
tempts to subvert individual liberties through establishment of a
tyranny. 1 Second, the individual right is limited by specific terms
in the Right to Arms Clause: "[T]he right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed.' 1 72 The phrase "keep and
bear" implies that permissible "arms" are only those which one
could conveniently "bear" on one's person.7 3
The Supreme Court's Second Amendment doctrine differs
from the above interpretation. The Court's two Second Amend-
ment decisions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries decisions
have not endeavored to develop the plain meaning of the Second
Amendment.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has decided only four cases involving the
Second Amendment in 206 years. The Court's most significant
case, United States v. Miller,14 was decided over fifty-five years
ago.
A. Nineteenth Century: Dred Scott, Cruikshank and Presser
Dred Scott v. Sandford7 5 is the Supreme Court's only ante-
bellum case that even refers to the Second Amendment. 76 Dred
Scott held that African-Americans were not citizens of the United
States and, therefore, were not entitled to the privileges of citizen-
ship. 77 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney stated that, if
the Court were to have held otherwise, African-Americans would
have had such rights as those including "the right.., to keep and
carry arms wherever they went.' 7' 8 Through this dictum espousing
an argumentum ad horribilis,7 9 the Court suggested that the right
to "keep and carry arms" was an individual right that travels with
citizens wherever they may go.' 80
The Court repudiated this suggestion twenty years later in
171. For discussion of the plain meaning of the terms of the Militia Clause, see supra
parts II.B.1-3.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
173. See supra part II.B.6. For discussion of the plain meaning of the Right to Arms
Clause, see supra parts II.B.4-7.
174. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
175. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
176. Kates, supra note 1, at 246.
177. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17.
178. Id. at 417 (emphasis added); O'Donnell, supra note 35, at 506.
179. See Kates, supra note 1, at 246.
180. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417; O'Donnell, supra note 35, at 506.
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United States v. Cruikshank.'8' Cruikshank involved two African-
American men whose firearms were seized by Louisiana members
of the Ku Klux Klan.182 Even though Cruikshank was essentially a
civil rights case, the Court discussed the right to keep and bear
arms. 83 Chief Justice Waite concluded that an individual right
is not... granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner depen-
dent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment de-
clares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no
more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the na-
tional government.
184
Since the Second Amendment guaranteed no individual right to
arms, no individual right could have been violated. 8"
The Court approvingly cited Cruikshank eleven years later in
Presser v. Illinois.188 Presser involved an Illinois statute that pro-
hibited "any body of men whatever, other than the regular organ-
ized volunteer militia of th[e] State, and the troops of the United
States... [from] drill[ing] or parad[ing] with arms in any city, or
town, of [the] State."'18 7 In rejecting the claim that the statute vio-
lated the Second Amendment, the Court reaffirmed that the Sec-
ond Amendment did not guarantee an individual right to keep and
bear arms.'88 Specifically, the Court held that "the [s]tates cannot
... prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to
deprive the United States of [its] rightful resource for maintaining
the public security, and disable the people from performing their
duty to the general government."'8 9 Thus, "a state [could] not dis-
arm its citizens ... because... they belong to the federal militia[,]
and the states are prohibited from disarming the federal
militia."190
Ignoring the Second Amendment's history and language,' 9' the
Cruikshank and Presser Courts held that the Second Amendment
did not guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms. The
Court would not hear another Second Amendment case until fifty-
181. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
182. Id.
183. See O'Donnell, supra note 35, at 506.
184. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
187. Id. at 253.
188. Id. at 265.
189. Id.
190. O'Donnell, supra note 35, at 507.
191. See supra parts lI.A., II.B.
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five years later in United States v. Miller.92
B. United States v. Miller: The Seminal Case
Miller involved section 11 of the National Firearms Act of
1934,193 which imposed various application, registration, stamping
and monetary requirements on the transportation of firearms in
interstate commerce.19 4 Miller and an associate were charged with
illegal transportation from Oklahoma to Texas of a "shotgun hav-
ing a barrel less than 18 inches in length," since they did not pos-
sess the requisite stamp-affixed written order for the gun. 95 Miller
demurred, alleging in part that the National Firearms Act violated
the Second Amendment.'96 The district court sustained Miller's
demurrer, holding that section 11 of the Act violated the Second
Amendment.1
97
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice
McReynolds held that
[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel or less than eighteen inches in length"... has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to
keep and bear such an instrument.19 8
The Court thus conditioned the right to keep and bear arms on the
necessity of a "well regulated militia" to the security of a free
state. 99
The Court next stated the purpose of the Second Amend-
ment's right to keep and bear arms: "With obvious purpose to as-
sure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such
forces the declaration [the Militia Clause] and the guarantee [the
Right to Arms Clause] of the Second Amendment were made." 00
In support of its conclusion, the Court quoted extensively from the
session laws of Massachusetts, New York and Virginia, each of
which provided for organizing and arming their own state mili-
tias.20 1 Since each state's session laws required able-bodied indi-
192. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
193. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236.
194. Id.
195. Miller, 308 U.S. at 175-76 & n.1.
196. Id. at 176.
197. Id. at 177.
198. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
199. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
200. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
201. Id. at 180-82.
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viduals to purchase, possess and carry their own arms for militia
service,0 2 Justice McReynolds implicitly conceded that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to purchase, possess
("keep") and carry ("bear") arms.
Miller is consistent with the conditional, individual right the-
ory, since Miller (1) recognizes an individual's right 03 to keep and
bear arms, 04 but (2) conditions the individual right on the neces-
sity of an effective, perpetual and "well regulated militia."20 5 How-
ever, Miller fails to develop the plain meaning of the Second
Amendment. If Justice McReynolds had carefully analyzed the his-
tory and language of the Amendment, then he might have con-
cluded that: (1) the term "militia" refers to all able-bodied individ-
uals, including Miller,20 ' not "[a] body of citizens enrolled for
military discipline;"207 (2) the term "well regulated" means prop-
erly disciplined on how to use arms, 08 not government con-
trolled; 09 (3) the phrase "security of a free state" refers specifically
to the right of individuals such as Miller to defend themselves
against federal government attempts to establish a tyranny,21 0 not
vaguely to the "continuation and . . . effectiveness" of the mili-
tia;21 (4) the phrase "keep and bear" refers to the right of individ-
uals such as Miller to possess and carry arms, 2 not merely to the
right of militiamen to carry their arms when mustered to duty;
213
and (5) the term "arms" includes weapons that are readily accessi-
ble, adequate for individual self-defense and capable of being
borne on one's person,21 4 not merely weapons with a "reasonable
relationship to ... the militia"215 and, therefore, may also include
Miller's sawed-off shotgun.21 6
Since the Miller Court did not develop the Second Amend-
202. Id.
203. Actually, Miller recognizes the individual's obligation to purchase, keep and bear
arms. The term "obligation" is stronger than the term "right," since the former suggests
that the individual is required to keep and bear arms, while the latter suggests that the
individual has the choice.
204. Miller, 307 U.S. at 180-82.
205. Id. at 178.
206. See supra part H.B.1.
207. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79.
208. See supra part II.B.2.
209. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79.
210. See supra part II.B.3.
211. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
212. See supra part II.B.5.
213. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179-82.
214. See supra part II.B.6.
215. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
216. Id.
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ment's plain meaning, the Court should reexamine Miller's "rea-
sonable relationship" test in light of the Second Amendment's his-
tory and language. 217 Up until now, however, the Court has been
content to leave Second Amendment interpretation to the circuit
courts.
C. The Second Amendment in the Circuit Courts
1. Cases v. United States.2 1 s Three years after the Supreme
Court decided Miller, Jose Cases Velasquez was indicted for violat-
ing section 2(e) of the Federal Firearms Act 1 by transporting a
firearm and ammunition in interstate commerce. 220 A jury found
him guilty and the District Court for Puerto Rico sentenced him to
prison.22 ' Cases appealed his conviction, contending, inter alia,
that the Act was unconstitutional because it infringed the Second
Amendment's right of the people to keep and bear arms.
222
The First Circuit affirmed Cases' conviction. Writing for the
court, Judge Woodbury first noted that the act "undoubtedly cur-
tails to some extent the right of individuals to keep and bear arms
but it does not follow.., that it is bad under the Second Amend-
ment. '223 After discussing Miller, the court concluded that
[a]pparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the federal government
can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual as well as
by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession of arms
which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia.
2 24
217. The Court probably will not reexamine the Miller decision; indeed, the Court has
heard only one Second Amendment case in the fifty-six years since Miller. In Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court upheld the 1968 Gun Control Act under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 66. In so doing, the Court concluded
that the Act's "restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally
suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties." Id. at 65
n.8. Since the Court cited Miller in support of its conclusion, id., Miller's "reasonable rela-
tionship" standard is still good law.
218. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
219. 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (repealed 1968).
220. Cases, 131 F.2d at 919.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 921. Judge Woodbury also stated that "[tihe right to keep and bear arms is
not a right conferred upon the people by the federal [C]onstitution. Whatever rights in this
respect the people may have depend upon local legislation; the only function of the Second
Amendment being to prevent the federal government ... from infringing that right." Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, Judge Woodbury seemed to suggest that the Second Amendment's
only purpose was to prevent the federal government from infringing on the states' right to
organize their militias.
224. Id. at 922; see also Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
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Although the Cases court followed the Miller decision, Judge
Woodbury questioned whether "the Supreme Court in [that] case
was attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all
cases." 225 The court reasoned that since (1) modern lethal weapons,
which the Framers did not contemplate, invariably have military
uses; and (2) under Miller, "private persons," who are "not present
or prospective members of any military unit," could possess dis-
tinctly military arms having a "reasonable relationship to the pres-
ervation or efficiency of a well regulated militia;" each Second
Amendment case, "like cases under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause,
must be decided on its own facts and the line between what is and
what is not a valid federal restriction pricked out by decided cases
falling one side or the other of the line."2 2  Forty years later, the
next major Second Amendment case would involve a small shop-
ping center in the Chicago suburb of Morton Grove.27
225. Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.
226. Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps Justice Scalia would question Judge Woodbury's
decision to adopt a case-by-case approach to Second Amendment analysis:
For when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and say,
"This is the basis of our decision," I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain
myself as well. If the next case should have such different facts that my political
or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be una-
ble to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing princi-
ple. In the real world of appellate judging, it displays more judicial restraint to
adopt such a course than to announce that, "on balance," we think the law was
violated here-leaving ourselves free to say in the next case that, "on balance," it
was not .... Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.
... [Wihen an appellate judge comes up with nothing better than a totality of
the circumstances test to explain his decision, he is not so much pronouncing the
law in the normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of fact finding
.... At the margins, of course, [a determination of fact] can become an issue of
law ... .But when all.., legal rules have been exhausted and have yielded no
answer, we call what remains a question of fact... [for which] there is no single
"right" answer. It could go either way.
Rule of Law, supra note 13, at 1180-81. Borrowing from Justice Scalia's analysis, Justice
Woodbury's preference for the "case-by-case" approach over a general rule of law for the
Second Amendment leaves room for "personal rule[s]" based on judges' individual "political
or policy preferences." Id. at 1180, 1182. The Cases court, for example, followed the Miller
decision, which requires that a firearm have a "reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Cases, 131 F.2d at 922; see Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
However, Judge Woodbury himself suggests that "distinctly military arms, such as machine
guns, trench mortars, anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns," are forbidden to private persons, even
though these arms seem directly related to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia. In this way, Judge Woodbury seizes upon the ambiguity of Miller's "reasonable rela-
tionship" test in order to render a feasible decision as a matter of politics and policy. What
remains, however, is the need for a Second Amendment jurisprudence that enables and re-
quires judges to render decisions based on the rule of law, not politics or policy.
227. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE 94 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter DEFENSE] (discussing Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982)).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
2. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove.228 When Geoffrey
LaGioia applied for a permit to open a gun store in a Morton
Grove shopping mall, "people didn't like the idea.., of a gun shop
where children could watch people buy guns and window-shop for
guns. This was an all-night convenience food mart; the walls
weren't very secure. Anyone could break in and take a whole load
of guns. '229 So, on the evening of June 8, 1981, at a public hearing
attended by local citizens and imported crowds, 230 covered by The
MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour and Nightline,231 Morton Grove's resi-
dents spoke. At about 1:30 a.m., by a four-to-two vote, Morton
Grove became "the first town in the United States to prohibit the
possession of handguns in the home. "232
The following morning, the media deluge, hate mail and death
threats began.2 3 3 But the real threat came from Victor D. Quilici,
Esq., a Morton Grove gun owner.2 4 Quilici challenged the ordi-
nance under the Second Amendment.235 The District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held, inter alia, that the Second
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms was not incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, was inapplicable
to Morton Grove.23 6
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.237 Writing for the court, Judge
228. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
229. DEFENSE, supra note 227, at 94 (quoting village attorney Martin Ashman). For a
fascinating account of Morton Grove's passage of an ordinance that banned the possession
of handguns in the home, see id. at 93-103.
230. "The night of the vote, the NRA trucked [people] in by truck, bus, car; American
flags [were] all over the place, John Deere hats. It looked like rural America was here." Id.
at 95 (quoting village trustee Greg Youstra).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 96. Ordinance No. 81-11 provided that "[n]o person shall possess, in the
Village of Morton Grove ... any handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently
inoperative." Quilici, 695 F.2d at 264.
Greg Youstra, who cast the deciding vote, recalled the evening:
When they mentioned my name, ... a cheer went up from the outside, like you
know, Caesar Augustus. They were all out there saying, "There's no way in the
world the guy is going to vote for this thing." And when I said, "I vote for the
ordinance," [there were] boos and "You sold us out, you dirty commie." It was
unbelievable.
DEFENSE, supra note 227, at 96 (alteration in original).
233. DEFENSE, supra note 227, at 97.
234. Id.
235. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 264. Quilici also sued under article I, § 22 of the Illinois Con-
stitution and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id.
236. Id. at 265; see Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill.
1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
237. See Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270.
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Bauer rejected Quilici's assertion that Presser v. Illinois2"s "sup-
ports the theory the [S]econd [A]mendment right to keep and bear
arms is a fundamental right which the state cannot regulate
.... ,23 Judge Bauer could not understand the assertion, since
the Presser decision plainly states that "[t]he Second Amendment declares
that it shall not be infringed, but this ... means no more than it shall not
be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other
effect than to restrict the powers of the National government .... 1,o
Even though the court held that the Second Amendment was
inapplicable to the states, Judge Bauer briefly discussed the
Amendment's scope:
Construing th[e Second Amendment] according to its plain meaning, it
seems clear that the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the pres-
ervation of a militia. This is precisely the manner in which the Supreme
Court interpreted the [S]econd [A]mendment in United States v. Miller
.... There the Court held that the right to keep and bear arms extends
only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated
militia.
24 1
Thus, the court concluded that the Second Amendment does not
guarantee an absolute right to keep and bear arms. Eleven years
later, the Eighth Circuit would decide the circuit courts' last major
Second Amendment case.
3. United States v. Hale.242 After Wilbur Hale was convicted
of possession of a machine gun 243 and unregistered firearms, 244 he
appealed his conviction on the grounds that, inter alia, his indict-
ment violated the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.24" Relying on Miller, Hale argued that "the Second Amend-
ment bars the federal government from regulating the particular
weapons seized because the weapons are susceptible to military use
and are therefore, by definition, related to the existence of 'a well
238. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
239. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 269.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 270 (citation omitted). Referring to Miller, the court stated that "the right
to keep and bear arms exists only as it relates to protecting the public security.. . ." Id.
(emphasis added). For a discussion of what the "public security" means, see supra part
ll.B.3.
242. 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1614 (1993).
243. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp. 1992), cited in Hale, 978 F.2d at 1017.
244. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1988), cited in Hale, 978 F.2d at 1017.




The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
Writing for the court, Judge Gibson restated the Miller rule247 and
observed that "Miller simply 'did not hold . . . that the Second
Amendment is an absolute prohibition against all regulation of...
any instrument capable of being used in military action.' ,,24 Since
Hale failed to prove that his weapons possession was "reasonably
related to a well regulated militia," his conviction was affirmed.49
Cases, Quilici and Hale are circuit court landmarks to the vi-
tality of Presser's nonincorporation doctrine and Miller's "reasona-
ble relationship" test. Since the Due Process Clause does not in-
corporate the Second Amendment, and most private citizens
probably cannot show that their firearms bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to a well regulated militia, it is necessary to hinge greater
protection of the individual right to keep and bear arms on state
constitutions and courts.
IV. THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN THE STATES
Several state constitutions offer "refuge" from the Second
Amendment's narrow conditional, individual right to keep and
bear arms. Over the past two decades, the highest state courts have
relied increasingly on state constitutional provisions "to grant
greater protection for an individual's rights than is provided by the
Federal Constitution. 2 5 0
A. Judicial Federalism and the States
When the highest state courts interpret the Federal Constitu-
tion, their decisions are always subject to review by the United
States Supreme Court.251 However, when such state courts inter-
246. Id.
247. See supra part III.B.
248. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1019 (quoting United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)). The court briefly discussed the history of state
militias, and concluded that the Second Amendment "prevented federal laws that would
infringe upon the possession of arms by individuals and thus render state militias impo-
tent." Id. Thus, the court recognized a conditional, individual right to keep and bear arms
for the preservation of state militias and, therefore, "as ... an implicit check on federal
power." Id. (citing Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12).
249. Id. at 1020 (citing Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942)).
250. Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Su-
preme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 732 (1982) [hereinafter Activism]; Peter J. Galie,
State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalism and the Other Constitutions, JUDICATURE,
Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 100 [hereinafter Federalism].
251. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988); Activism, supra note 250, at 732.
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pret their own state constitutions, "their decisions are supreme,
unless their interpretation conflicts with a provision of the Federal
Constitution." '252 Thus, if one of the highest state courts interprets
one of its provisions in such a way as to grant greater protection
for an individual's right than the Federal Constitution provides,
that interpretation is not subject to Supreme Court review.253
States can practice judicial federalism in any of several ways,
but two models are especially noteworthy. First, under the "Equiv-
alence-Plus" model, "state courts will interpret their constitutional
provisions to grant greater protection than is forthcoming from the
Supreme Court. 25 4 As the Alaska Supreme Court stated in Ravin
v. State:
255
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed on
us by the United States Supreme Court[] ... we are free, as we are under a
duty to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our
Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be
within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional language and to be
necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the
core of our constitutional heritage.
256
Second, under the "Non-Equivalent Text" model, state courts will
decide cases involving "unique provisions of state constitutions





Judicial Federalism is manifest in state supreme courts that
afford broader individual liberties under their state constitutions
than the Federal Constitution provides.258 The right to arms is
broader under most state constitutions.
252. Activism, supra note 250, at 732.
253. Id. at 732 & n.6 (citing Oi'egon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967)).
254. Federalism, supra note 250, at 102.
255. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
256. Id. at 513 (citing Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970))
(footnotes omitted). Of course, state courts also may rule that "a state constitutional provi-
sion grants less protection than is provided by the federal constitution." Federalism, supra
note 250, at 102 (citing Serna v. Superior Court, 707 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1985)).
A unique provision in Article I, § 24 of the California Constitution provides that
"[r]ights guaranteed by this constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution." See Federalism, supra note 250, at 108.
257. Federalism, supra note 250, at 103 & n.21 (citing Sibley v. Board of Supervisors,
477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985); Greenberg v. Kimmelmann, 494 A.2d 294 (N.J. 1985); Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
258. Federalism, supra note 250, at 101-02.
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B. The State Constitutions
25
Forty-three states provide a constitutional right to keep and
bear arms.260 Thirty-eight of these states provide rights the plain
language of which seems broader than the Second Amendment's
language.61 Six of these states provide rights to keep and bear
arms not only in defense of self, family, home, property and the
259. Robert Dowlut previously compiled the state constitutional arms provisions. See
Robert Dowlut, Guarantees to Arms, supra note 14, at 84-89 (appendix).
260. Those forty-three states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
The seven states that do not provide a constitutional right to arms are: California, Iowa,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin.
261. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5;
COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1, para. VIII; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32;
KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4; Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1, para. 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; MASS.
CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII; ME. CONST. art. I, § 16; MICH. CONsT. art. I, § 6; Miss. CONST. art,
III, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV.
CONsT. art. I, § II, para. 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 1 (amended 1984); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art.
I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 26; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; Wyo. CONST. art. I,
§ 24.
Of the remaining six states, Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina and South Carolina have
constitutional guarantees that exactly match the language of the Second Amendment.
ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 19; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30; S.C. CONST. art.
I, § 20. Virginia, after adding a Right to Arms Clause, now has substantially the same lan-
guage as the Second Amendment. VA. CONST. art. I, § 20.
Despite their broader plain language, fourteen of the forty-three state constitutions ex-
pressly condition the right to keep and bear arms on factors other than the need for a well
regulated militia. Specifically, the Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico and North Carolina constitutions either proscribe or allow their leg-
islatures to regulate the carrying of concealed weapons. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; Ky.
BILL OF RIGHTS § 1, para. 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 12; Mo. CONST.
art. I, § 23; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.
The Tennessee and Texas constitutions allow their legislatures to regulate the wearing
of arms in order to prevent crime. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23.
Idaho's constitution provides that the legislature may punish the use of firearms. See
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.
Illinois' constitution expressly subjects the individual right to keep and bear arms to
the police power. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.
Georgia's constitution provides that the legislature may regulate the manner of bearing
arms. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. VIII.
Oklahoma's constitution provides that the legislature may regulate the carrying of
weapons. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26.
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262state, but also for hunting, recreational and other lawful uses. 6
Thirty of these states use language roughly corresponding to the
Michigan Constitution: "Every person has a right to keep and bear
arms for the defense of himself and the state." ' Thus, most
states (1) expressly guarantee an individual right to keep and bear
arms; (2) do not condition the right on the necessity of a well regu-
lated militia to the security of a free state; and (3) also provide an
individual right of self-defense.264
C. Case Studies: The Maine and West Virginia Constitutions
Even though many state constitutional arms provisions pro-
vide a broader right to keep and bear arms than the Second
Amendment provides,285 most state courts have held that their own
state's constitutional right to keep and bear arms is not absolute:
[C]ourts throughout the country have recognized that the constitutional
right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and these courts have uniformly
upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose rea-
sonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to [keep and]
bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.
266
Since the right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, each state
may reasonably regulate this right in order to promote the health,
safety and welfare of all its citizens.261
This Section considers the Maine and West Virginia constitu-
tional arms provisions in order to illustrate the broad right to keep
and bear arms that exists in many states. Although both states'
constitutions provide a broader right to keep and bear arms than
the Second Amendment provides, both states' legislatures may use
their police powers to regulate the right to keep and bear arms.
1. The Maine Constitution. Maine's constitution provides:
"Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right
shall never be questioned. '2 8 This language provides a broader
262. These states are: Delaware, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota and
West Virginia.
263. MICH. CONsT. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
264. See id.
265. See supra part IV.B.
266. State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 146 (W. Va. 1988); see
also State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 818 (Me. 1990).
267. Brown, 571 A.2d at 820-21; Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 145-49.
268. ME. CONsT. art. I, § 16. From 1819 to 1987, article I, § 16 provided: "Every citizen
has a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense; and this right shall never be
questioned." Brown, 571 A.2d at 816 n.1 (emphasis added). In 1987, the people of Maine
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right to keep and bear arms than the Second Amendment provides
for at least two reasons. First, unlike the Second Amendment,
which creates an ambiguous "right of the people to keep and bear
arms,"2 69 Maine's constitution creates an unambiguous 270 right to
keep and bear arms for "[e]very citizen." 171 This specific language
suggests that Maine's right to keep and bear arms is an individual,
not a government right.2  Second, unlike the Second Amend-
ment's Militia Clause,273 which conditions the right to keep and
bear arms on the necessity of a well regulated militia, Maine's con-
stitutional right to keep and bear arms is unconditional.
Even though Maine's constitutional right to keep and bear
arms "shall never be questioned, 2 74 Maine's legislature may use
its police powers to regulate this right in order to promote the gen-
eral welfare of Maine's citizens.
voted to amend § 16 in order to delete the phrase "for the common defense." Id. at 816. As
Maine's Attorney General explained in the required explanatory statement, see ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 353 (West 1989), the amendment's purpose was to "establish a new
personal right to keep and carry weapons, in place of the existing [collective] right to bear
arms for the common defence." Brown, 571 A.2d at 817-18 (quoting attorney general's ex-
planatory statement). This amendment was necessary because prior to 1987, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine had held that the old § 16 did not establish a personal right to keep
and bear arms, but only a collective right of defense. See id. at 818 (citing State v. Friel, 508
A.2d 123 (Me. 1986)); see also State v. McKinnon, 133 A.2d 885, 888-89 (Me. 1957) (sug-
gesting in dicta that "[i]f [the defendant's] possession of [a] firearm was for the purpose of
and used in hunting," and not for the purpose of ensuring "the common defense," such
possession "could not possibly come within the constitutional rights of [the defendant] in
bearing arms for the common defense").
269. U.S. CONST. amend. H (emphasis added). For a discussion of the meaning of the
term "people" in the Second Amendment, see infra part II.B.4.
270. See Brown, 571 A.2d at 819. Even though the language of § 16 is unambiguous, the
court rejected the defendant's contention that "we need not, and indeed must not, look
beyond the bare words." Id. Citing Justice Holmes' decision in Gompers v. United States,
233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914), the court observed that "the words of the First Amendment are
equally unambiguous and unqualified ... [y]et the ... Supreme Court has 'reject[ed] the
view that freedom of speech and association are "absolutes"... in the sense that the scope
of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment.'"
Brown, 571 A.2d at 819 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)).
271. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
272. But see supra note 268. Even where the right to keep and bear arms is an individ-
ual right, the source of the right may be the collective right of all individuals to keep and
bear arms "for the common defense," i.e., to protect the state from federal or foreign inva-
sion. See Armed Citizens, supra note 15, at 615-22; Historiography, supra note 1, at 2 n.4;
see also supra text accompanying note 268.
For a comparison of the state's right and individual right theories in Second Amend-
ment interpretation, see supra part I.
273. "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
274. ME. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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a. Maine's "Non-Absolute" Right. In State v. Brown,' 5 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine interpreted the right to keep and
bear arms in the context of a criminal statute that prohibits con-
victed felons from possessing firearms. 276 Before 1988, Edward
Brown was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license
was revoked.2 77 Since Brown's license had been revoked because he
was an "habitual motor vehicle offender, '278 he was charged with a
felony and convicted.
In 1988, Brown was indicted under criminal law section 393(1)
for, inter alia, possession of a firearm by a felon.2 79 On his motion
to dismiss, Brown argued that Maine's possession-by-a-felon stat-
ute is unconstitutional because, under article I, section 16 of
Maine's constitution, the right to keep and bear arms is absolute
and, therefore, the state cannot infringe this right due to his previ-
ous conviction.280
The trial court dismissed Brown's indictment, holding section
393(1) unconstitutional as it applied to Brown.28' Specifically, the
trial court recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not
absolute, but concluded that "there is no rational relationship be-
tween the possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted




The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court's dismissal
of the indictment. 23 The court held that article I, section 16 does
not provide an absolute right to keep and bear arms;284 rather, sec-
tion 16 provides an individual right that is "subject to reasonable
regulation by the legislature. '28 5 In support of its holding, the
court cited the attorney general's explanatory statement 286 and
what it called the "common sense view of the ... voters of Maine
275. 571 A.2d 816 (Me. 1990).
276. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 393(1) (West 1989) provides: "No person who has
been convicted of any crime ... which is [a felony] ... shall own, have in his possession or
under his control any firearm, unless such person has obtained a permit under this section."
Id.
277. Brown, 571 A.2d at 817 n.3.
278. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 2292(1)(B), 2298(2) (Supp. 1989).
Maine's "habitual motor vehicle offender" charge is a felony punishable by up to five years
imprisonment. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2298(2) (Supp. 1989).
279. Brown, 571 A.2d at 816; see supra note 276.
280. Brown, 571 A.2d at 817.
281. Id.
282. Id. Thus, the trial court reasoned that the Maine legislature had exceeded its po-
lice powers in enacting § 393(1). See id.
283. Id. at 822.
284. Id. at 817, 819.
285. Id. at 818.




(1) The Explanatory Statement. Before Maine's voters
amended section 16 in 1987,288 the Maine attorney general pub-
lished the required explanation of the proposed amendment.8 9
This explanation provided:
The proposal would amend the Maine Constitution to establish a new per-
sonal right to keep and carry weapons, in place of the existing right to bear
arms for the common defense. In proposing the amendment, several legisla-
tors formally expressed their understanding and intention that the proposed
personal right, like the existing collective right, would be subject to reason-
able limitation by legislation enacted at the state or local level.
290
Since publication of this explanation creates a presumption that
Maine's voters have "full knowledge of the terms of the amend-
ment,"29' the court assumed that the voters intended to adopt the
amendment under the terms of the explanatory statement, "in-
cluding the interpretation that the individual right created by the
amendment ... is not absolute but rather remains subject to rea-
sonable regulation by the legislature.
29 2
(2) The Common Sense View. The court next suggested that
common sense requires that amended section 16 does not provide
an absolute right to keep and bear arms:
Plainly, the people of Maine who voted for the amendment never intended
that an inmate at Maine State Prison or a patient at a mental hospital
would'have an absolute right to possess a firearm. Once it becomes appar-
ent, as common sense requires it to be, that amended section 16 does not
bar some reasonable regulation of the constitutional right to possess fire-
arms, the only remaining question becomes what are the outer bounds of
reasonableness for the regulation of that non-absolute right.
2 3
Using two extreme examples to illustrate the consequences of an
absolute right to keep and bear arms, the court reasoned that
Maine voters could not possibly have intended such consequences
287. Brown, 571 A.2d at 818.
288. See supra text accompanying note 268. Section 16 was amended in 1987 to read as
it does today. See supra part IV.C.1. For a discussion of Maine's constitutional amendment
procedure, see Brown, 571 A.2d at 817.
289. ME. RE v. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 353 (West 1989).
290. Brown, 571 A.2d at 817-18 (quoting attorney general's explanatory statement)
(emphasis added).
291. Id. at 818 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 133 A. 265, 266 (1926)).




and, therefore, the right to keep and bear arms was not absolute.294
Thus the court considered whether prohibiting a convicted felon
like Brown from possessing a firearm was an unreasonable regula-
tion of the right to keep and bear arms.
b. Reasonable Regulation. The court first noted that the leg-
islature has "'police power' to pass general regulatory laws pro-
moting the public health, welfare, safety, and morality."2 5 But the
legislature must exercise its police powers reasonably: "Reasona-
bleness in the exercise of the State's police power requires that [1]
the purpose of the enactment be in the interest of the public wel-
fare and... [2] the methods utilized bear a rational relationship to
the intended goals. '296 The court first recognized Maine's legiti-
mate state purpose to protect the public from "the possession of
firearms by those previously found to be in such serious violation





Next, the court explained the rational relationship between
prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms and the goal
of protecting the public: "One who has committed any felony has
displayed a degree of lawlessness that makes it entirely reasonable
for the legislature, concerned for the safety of the public it repre-
sents, to want to keep firearms out of the hands of such a per-
son."298 Since Brown, as an "habitual motor vehicle offender," op-
erated a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked, Brown
demonstrated such a disregard for the law that, as applied to him,
the legislative determination that he is an undesirable person to
294. Id.
295. Id. at 820. Maine's constitutional "police power" clause provides: "The Legisla-
ture, with the exceptions hereinafter stated, shall have full power to make and establish all
reasonable laws and regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of this State, not
repugnant to this Constitution, nor to that of the United States." ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3,
§ 1 (emphasis added). Thus Maine's constitution requires that the legislature's regulation of
constitutional rights be reasonable. Brown, 571 A.2d at 820.
296. Brown, 571 A.2d at 820 (quoting National Hearing Aid Cntrs., Inc. v. Smith, 376
A.2d 456, 460 (Me. 1977)). Eight months later, the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed this
two-pronged test in Hilly v. City of Portland, 582 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me. 1990).
297. Brown, 571 A.2d at 821. The court cited decisions from several state jurisdictions
which had espoused "the legitimate state purpose of protecting the public from misuse of
firearms." Id. at 820. The court also discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), in which the Court endorsed Congress' legitimate interest
in keeping "guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that 'they may not be
entrusted with a firearm without becoming a threat to society.'" Id. at 820-21 (quoting
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63 (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977))).
298. Id. at 821.
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possess a firearm299 bore a rational relationship to the legislature's
interest in promoting the public safety.300 Thus, the court con-
cluded that Maine's possession-by-a-felon statute constituted a
reasonable regulation of the state's constitutional right to keep and
bear arms. Eight months later, the court would uphold one more
regulation on the carrying of concealed weapons.
c. Other Limitations. In Hilly v. City of Portland,0 1 the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the state can regulate the carrying
of concealed weapons by requiring its citizens to complete a con-
cealed firearms permit application.30 2 When James Hilly failed to
complete the entire form, his application was denied.,30 3 Hilly then
filed a complaint and later moved for summary judgment that the
concealed firearms statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to
304 thkeep and bear arms. After the trial court denied his motion,306
Hilly appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judg-
ment,30  holding that the concealed firearms statute is rationally
related to the state's "justifiable public safety concern" posed by
the carrying of concealed weapons.
3 0 7
Even though article I, section 16 of Maine's Constitution pro-
299. This legislative determination is embodied in Maine's "possession-by-a-felon"
statute. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 393(1) (West 1989); see supra text accompanying
note 276.
300. See Brown, 571 A.2d at 821.
301. 582 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1990).
302. Id. at 1214-15. Maine's concealed firearms statute is located at ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2001-2006 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
303. Hilly, 582 A.2d at 1214.
304. Id. at 1214-15.
305. The trial court found that ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2001-2006 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1989) were consistent with the right to keep and bear arms in article I, § 16 of the
Maine Constitution. Hilly, 582 A.2d at 1215.
306. Hilly, 582 A.2d at 1217.
307. Id. at 1215. "Recognizing the threat to public safety posed by the carrying of con-
cealed weapons," id., the court held that "Maine's concealed firearms statute is a reasonable
response to the justifiable public safety concern engendered by the carrying of concealed
firearms. The permit requirements pass constitutional muster as an acceptable regulation of
the individual's right to keep and bear arms." Id. The court cited the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals decision in In re Metheney, 391 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1990), as one
example of a state court that has held constitutional a statute regulating the carrying of
concealed weapons. Id.
Although the court did not explain why the carrying of concealed weapons poses a par-
ticular public safety risk, one can readily infer the explanation. If a weapon is concealed,
then the public is less likely to be aware of the weapon and, therefore, less likely to take
precautions against its use. See id.; see also Metheney, 391 S.E.2d at 638 (concluding that
West Virginia concealed firearms statute does not infringe state right to keep and bear
arms, but merely regulates manner in which citizens may do so, "given the inherently dan-
gerous nature of a concealed deadly weapon").
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vides a broader right to keep and bear arms than the Second
Amendment provides, section 16 does not provide an absolute
right. Under article IV, part 3, section 1 of Maine's constitution,
the legislature may exercise its police power to reasonably regulate
the right to keep and bear arms. The legislature has enacted stat-
utes that (1) prohibit convicted felons from possessing firearms
and (2) require a license in order to carry a concealed weapon.
Even though the language of West Virginia's constitutional right to
keep and bear arms differs from the language of Maine's constitu-
tional right, the State of West Virginia has enacted similar statutes
regulating the right to keep and bear arms.
2. The West Virginia Constitution. West Virginia's constitu-
tion provides: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for
the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting
and recreational purposes. ' ' 0°8 Like the language of Maine's consti-
tutional arms provision, this language provides a broader right to
keep and bear arms than the Second Amendment provides. Unlike
the ambiguous0 9 Second Amendment, the Militia Clause of which
conditions the right of "the people" to keep and bear arms on the
necessity of a well regulated militia to the security of a free
state; °10 article III, section 22 of West Virginia's constitution pro-
vides an unconditional right to keep and bear arms for every "per-
son.)31 1 Moreover, unlike article I, section 16 of Maine's constitu-
tion, which does not describe the precise uses for which "[e]very
citizen has a right to keep and bear arms;" ' 2 article III, section 22
specifically provides that the right to keep and bear arms may be
used "for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful
hunting and recreational use."3 13 The specific language of article
III, section 22 offers greater protection to West Virginia citizens
than the general language of article I, section 16 offers to Maine
citizens. 4
308. W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 22. The West Virginia legislature proposed this amend-
ment in 1985; it was enacted November 4, 1986.
309. See supra part IV.C.1.
310. See U.S. CONsT. amend. II.; see also supra parts II.B.1-3.
311. See W. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 22.
312. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 16.
313. See W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 22.
314. Specifically, article I, § 16 of Maine's constitution does not expressly specify
"hunting" or "recreational use" as permissible uses of the right to keep and bear arms. ME.
CONST. art. I, § 16. Thus, Maine courts could interpret § 16 to exclude such uses. However,
§ 22 expressly provides the right to keep and bear arms not only for self-defense, but also
for "hunting and recreational use." W. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 22. Thus, West Virginia courts
could uphold reasonable regulations of the right to keep and bear arms as applied to hunt-
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Although the language of West Virginia's constitution seems
to provide a broader right to keep and bear arms than either the
Second Amendment or Maine's constitution provides, the West
Virginia legislature's police power also subjects the state's right to
keep and bear arms to reasonable regulations.
a. West Virginia's "Non-Absolute" Right. In State ex rel.
City of Princeton v. Buckner,3 15 West Virginia's Supreme Court of
Appeals considered the constitutionality of a statute that pro-
scribed the carrying of "dangerous or deadly weapon[s]" without a
state license.3 16 When a Princeton City police officer arrested a
drunk driver on March 10, 1987, he searched the driver's jacket
and found an unlicensed pistol.31 7 The officer sought a warrant for
the driver's arrest from the county magistrate." 8 The magistrate
refused to issue a warrant against the driver, concluding that West
Virginia Code section 61-7-1, which proscribed the carrying of a
"dangerous and deadly weapon" without a license,319 violated the
state constitutional right to keep and bear arms.32 0 After the prose-
cuting attorney filed a writ of mandamus in the county circuit
court to compel the magistrate to issue a warrant, the circuit court
concluded that section 61-7-1 violated the right to keep and bear
arms.
321
In response to the circuit court's two certified questions, the
Supreme Court of Appeals held that section 61-7-1 unconstitution-
ally infringed on the right to keep and bear arms, since the statute
prohibited the carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon without a
ing or recreational uses, see infra part IV.C.2.b, but could not interpret § 22 to exclude such
uses.
315. 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988). For an extensive discussion of the factual back-
ground, holding and implications of Buckner, see Michael 0. Callaghan, Note, State v.
Buckner and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in West Virginia, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 425
(1989).
316. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 141. Specifically, W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (1975) provided: "If
any person, without a state license therefor ... carr[ies] about his person any revolver or
pistol, dirk, bowie knife, slung shot, razor, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or other
dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. . . ." Id. at 141 n.2.
317. Id. at 140.
318. Id. at 141.
319. See supra text accompanying note 316.
320. W. VA. CONST. art. Im, § 22.
321. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 141. The circuit court then certified two questions to the
Supreme Court of Appeals: (1) "[ils [§ 61-7-1] constitutional in light of... Article 3, Section
22 of the Constitution of West Virginia?", and (2) "[m]ay the Legislature of the State of
West Virginia by proper legislation regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in
the State of West Virginia?" Id.
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license for any purpose at all, including constitutionally protected
"defensive purposes," namely, "defense of self, family, home and
state. 3 2 2 Although the state had "a long history of statutory provi-
sions regulating the use of weapons, 3 23 the court noted that sev-
eral states had struck down statutes infringing on constitutional
provisions "guaranteeing a right to [keep and] bear arms for defen-
sive purposes. 3 24 Since the language in article III, section 22 pro-
vides a "sweeping"3 25 right to keep and bear arms "for the defense
of self, family, home and state,"3 26 but section 61-7-1 "is written as
a total proscription of the carrying of a dangerous or deadly
weapon without a license[;] . . . . [Section 61-7-1] operate[d] to
impermissibly infringe upon [the] constitutionally protected right
to [keep and] bear arms for defensive purposes. 3 27 Thus, the court
held that section 61-7-1 was unconstitutionally overbroad. 2 s The
court next considered whether West Virginia could reasonably reg-
ulate the right to keep and bear arms. 29
322. Id. at 144-45; see W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22.
323. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 141. The court discussed its interpretation of an 1882 stat-
utory arms provision in State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (1891). The statute in Workman ap-
peared to grant the right of self-defense only to persons of "good character and standing in
the community in which [they] live[]." See 1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7 (quoted in Buck-
ner, 377 S.E.2d at 141 n.4); see Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 141-42. The Workman court held
that the state constitution guaranteed a right of self-defense, but implied that the Second
Amendment limited the right to keep and bear arms to a "popular or collective" but not a
personal right. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 142. The Buckner court distinguished Workman on
the grounds that West Virginia's "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment," which was
codified as article III, § 22 of the state's constitution, provided a much broader right to keep
and bear arms. Id. at 143; see Callaghan, supra note 315, at 437.
324. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 143 (emphasis added) (citing City of Lakewood v. Pillow,
501 P.2d 744, 745-46 (Colo. 1972) (holding unconstitutional ordinance prohibiting posses-
sion, carrying or use of "dangerous or deadly weapon[s]," where ordinance was overbroad));
In re Brickey, 70 P. 609, 609 (Idaho 1902) (holding unconstitutional ordinance prohibiting
carrying of "deadly weapons" within city limits, where ordinance operated to infringe, not
merely regulate, right to keep and bear arms); State v. Blocker, 630 P.2d 824, 827 (Or. 1981)
(holding unconstitutional statute prohibiting carrying of deadly weapons outside home,
where state constitution protected right to keep and bear deadly weapons outside home for
defensive purposes). For a discussion of the Pillow, Brickey and Blocker cases, see Calla-
ghan, supra note 315, at 438-40.
325. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 143.
326. W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 22.
327. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 144 (emphasis added).
328. Id. Specifically, the court concluded that "the language embodied in [§ 61-7-1]
sweeps so broadly as to infringe a right that it cannot permissibly reach, in this case, the
constitutional right of a person to keep and bear arms in defense of self, family, home and
state ... ." Id. (emphasis added).
329. Id. at 145; see also supra text accompanying note 321.
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b. Reasonable Regulation. Like the Maine court in State v.
Brown,330 the Buckner court stated that the right to keep and bear
arms is not absolute. 331 Rather, the state has "police power" to
"enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the ... peace,
security, morals, health and general welfare" of its citizens.3 32 Thus
the court held:
[T]he West Virginia legislature may, through the valid exercise of its police
power, reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in
order to promote the health, safety and welfare of all citizens of this State,
provided that the restrictions or regulations imposed do not frustrate the
constitutional freedoms guaranteed by article III, section 22 of the West
Virginia Constitution .... 33
Like the Maine court in Brown,33 4 the Buckner court recognized
West Virginia's legitimate state purpose to protect its citizens from
the "unfettered" use of constitutionally protected arms.3 ' Al-
though the court did not expressly require that a given regulation
bear a "rational relationship" to the state's legitimate purpose,3 36
the court implicitly adopted this standard: "[T]he legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose in regulating the right to [keep and] bear arms
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise of this
right where the governmental purpose can be more narrowly
achieved.
'33 7
Thus the court, in dicta, approved more common state regula-
tions that prohibit (1) handgun possession by individuals previ-
ously convicted of a felony,338 and (2) the carrying of a "dangerous
330. 571 A.2d 816 (Me. 1986); see infra part IV.C.1.
331. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 145. The court recognized that other jurisdictions have
held "a government may regulate the exercise of the right [to keep and bear arms], provided
the regulations or restrictions do not frustrate the guarantees of the constitutional provi-
sion." Id.
332. Id. at 146 (citing State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 143 S.E.2d 351
(W. Va. 1965)).
333. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
334. See State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 820-21 (Me. 1990); see supra part IV.C.1.b.
335. See Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 145, 148-49.
336. Cf. Brown, 571 A.2d at 820.
337. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 146 (emphasis added). As one commentator has recognized,
a regulation would not bear a rational relationship to West Virginia's legitimate regulatory
interests where the regulation infringed on the right to keep and bear arms for defensive, as
opposed to offensive, purposes. Callaghan, supra note 315, at 445. Thus, West Virginia can
make it unlawful for any person in possession of a firearm "to carry, brandish or use such
weapon in a way or manner to cause, or threaten, a breach of the peace." See W. VA. CODE
§ 61-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1995), construed in State v. Daniel, 391 S.E.2d 90, 97 (W. Va.
1990).
338. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 147; see Callaghan, supra note 315, at 443.
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or deadly weapon." ' Like the Maine court in Hilly,4 0 two years
later the Supreme Court of Appeals would uphold a concealed
weapons regulation.
c. Other Limitations. In re Metheney3 41 involved several ap-
plicants for licenses to carry concealed weapons. 42 The county cir-
cuit court denied the applications on the grounds that the appli-
cants did not state a valid reason for carrying concealed
weapons. 43
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. The court
denied the applicant's contention that Buckner had recognized a
constitutional right to carry a concealed deadly weapon,3 44 and
held that the state's concealed weapons licensing statute was a
valid exercise of the legislature's police power. 45
3. Summary. Both the Maine and West Virginia constitu-
tions provide a broad, personal right to keep and bear arms.
Neither state's right is absolute; both states subject the right to
reasonable regulation under their legislatures' police powers.
West Virginia's constitutional provision specifies the uses for
the right to keep and bear arms; Maine's constitutional provision
does not. Even though this difference might allow the Maine courts
to exclude certain arms uses3 46 from constitutional protection;
3 47
the broad right to keep and bear arms in both Maine and West
339. See Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 147-48; Callaghan, supra note 315, at 444. The court
implicitly approved the statutory requirements for a license to carry a dangerous or deadly
weapon in W. VA. CODE § 61-7-2 (1988). Callaghan, supra note 315, at 444-45. Section 61-7-2
requires that a license applicant be (1) a U.S. citizen, (2) a West Virginia resident, (3) an
adult of "good moral character" and "temperate habits," (4) not convicted of a felony or
handgun offense, (5) employed for the previous five years, (6) qualified to handle handguns,
(7) has good reason and cause to carry such a weapon; and, that the applicant (8) post a
$5,000 surety bond. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 148 (summarizing § 61-7-2 requirements).
340. Hilly v. City of Portland, 582 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1990).
341. 391 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1990).
342. Id. at 636.
343. Id. at 636 & n.1. See generally, W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (1989) (requiring that an
applicant for a license to carry a concealed deadly weapon demonstrate that the weapon is
desired "for the defense of self, family, home or state, or other lawful purpose." Id. § 61-7-
4(a)(6)).
344. Metheney, 391 S.E.2d at 637.
345. Id. at 638; see Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 145-46.
346. Compare State v. McKinnon, 133 A.2d 885, 888-89 (Me. 1957) (holding that the
right to keep and bear arms as granted under the Maine constitution may protect the use of
firearms in certain hunting situations) with State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 816-18 (Me. 1990)
(holding that Maine's constitutional right to keep and bear arms is not an absolute right).
See supra text accompanying note 268.
347. See supra text accompanying note 314.
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Virginia offers citizens refuge from the Second Amendment's nar-
row conditional, individual right. 48 This refuge is beneficial for at
least two reasons. First, individuals who keep and bear arms may
be secure in the knowledge that their conduct, such as hunting or
other recreational activity, is engaged in pursuant to a lawful,
broad-based state constitutional right. Second, individuals who are
denied firearm licenses, 3 49 or defendants who are charged with
crimes for firearm use in self-defense, will be able to raise state
constitutional arguments and defenses.
CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment guarantees a conditional, individual
right to keep and bear arms. All able-bodied individuals may pos-
sess and carry basic firearms, such as handguns and rifles, that are
readily accessible, adequate for individual self-defense and capable
or being borne on one's person. This individual right is expressly
conditioned on the necessity of a well regulated militia to the se-
curity of a free state. Only where one keeps and bears arms specifi-
cally in order to defend oneself against federal government at-
tempts to establish a tyranny does the Second Amendment protect
one's conduct.
If the conditional, individual right theory is correct, then the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a narrow right.
Broader protection for individual owners hinges on more liberal
state constitutional rights to keep and bear arms like those rights
that Maine and West Virginia provide. This theory has at least one
virtue: it is not result-oriented, but founded upon the Second
348. See also Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (uphold-
ing village ordinance banning handgun possession in the home, where Illinois Constitution
explicitly subjected citizens' individual right to keep and bear arms to "the police power");
Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994) (en bane) (upholding ordinance ban-
ning manufacture, sale or possession of assault weapons under Colorado Constitution, where
ordinance was reasonably related to legitimate government interest in protecting public
health, safety and welfare and reasoning that "unique characteristics of assault weapons
coupled with prevalent use of such weapons for criminal purposes establish that such weap-
ons pose a substantial threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Denver") (emphasis
added); Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 1990) (holding state-created right to
bear arms (1) includes right to carry handgun with license, (2) is protected by the Due
Process Clause, and (3) is both a property and liberty interest for purposes of § 1983, where
Indiana Constitution provided broadly that "ihe people shall have a right to bear arms, for
the defense of themselves and the State").
349. See, e.g., Kellogg, 562 N.E.2d at 692-96 (holding that citizens had cause of action
under Due Process Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), where city violated state constitu-
tional right to keep and bear arms by denying citizens blank handgun application forms); cf.
Hilly v. City of Portland, 582 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1990) and In re Metheney, 391 S.E.2d 635 (W.
Va. 1990).
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Amendment's historical context and language. Even if this theory
does not end the search for plain meaning, it enables the search to
begin in the proper place.

